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ABSTRACT
This dissertation introduces three essays on the short and long run consequences
of educational choices. In the first essay “Conscription and the Returns to Educa-
tion: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity” we use a regression discontinuity
design to first identify the effect of peacetime conscription on education and labor
market outcomes. Results indicate that conscription eligibility induces a significant
increase in years of education, which is consistent with conscription avoidance be-
havior. However, this increased education does not result in either an increase in
graduation rates, or in employment and wages. Additional evidence shows conscrip-
tion has no direct effect on earnings, suggesting that the returns to education induced
by this policy was zero.
In the second essay “Quality of Higher Education and Earnings: Regression Dis-
continuity Evidence from the French Baccalaureate”, we use a regression discon-
tinuity design to examine the returns to quality of postsecondary education. We
compare the outcomes of students who marginally pass and fail the first round ex-
ams of the French Baccalaureate, a degree that students must earn to graduate from
secondary school. Marginally passing increases the likelihood of attending a higher
quality university and a STEM major. Threshold crossing also increases earnings
by 13.6 percent at the age of 27 to 29. After ruling out other channels that could
affect earnings, we conclude that increased access to higher quality postsecondary
education leads to a significant earnings premium.
In the third and final essay “Better or Best? High School Quality and Academic
Performance” we look at the effects of attending a higher quality high school on the
academic performance and college outcomes of young Chinese students. Specifically,
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in our analysis, we draw a distinction between going to a better school, regardless
of tier, and going to a top-tier school. We find that college entrance exam test score
gains and improved college outcomes are only realized for individuals attending the
most elite set of high schools.These results are mainly driven by males as we find no
significant effects on academic performance for females. Finally, we provide evidence
suggesting that these academic gains are mostly due to variation in teacher quality.
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, access to education has become more prevalent. For
example, in the United States, the percentage of 18 to 24 year olds enrolled in
postsecondary institutions increased from 25.7% in 1970 to 41% in 2012. With
education becoming more attainable, students are now also encouraged to seek higher
quality education, as it is associated with significant gains in the labor market. In
fact, parents in the United States spend a large amount of resources to help their
children gain access to “better” education. As a result, it is of equal importance to
understand the short and long run gains to attending more education as well as better
quality education. Naturally, a few questions arise: Do all policies that incentivize
students to get more education work? Does attending better quality schooling result
in significant academic and labor market gains? If so, do these results extend to all
types of students and all types of institutions?
This dissertation attempts to answer these questions through three essays on the
short and long run consequences of educational choices. One of the biggest challenges
in studying the effects of educational choice on later lifetime outcomes is that these
choices are effectively non-random. For instance, students with higher ability, more
motivation, better parental support are more likely to make “better” educational
choices. Furthermore, these attributes are usually unobservable to the researcher
and cannot be fully controlled for. As a result, it is hard to understand whether it
is the aforementioned attributes of these students as opposed to their educational
choices that ultimately leads to better lifetime outcomes. To overcome this problem,
we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) as the main identification strategy in
all three essays. This allows us to overcome the problem of selection into education
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by comparing two groups of students who are similar in observable and unobservable
characteristics, thus isolating the effects of education from confounding factors.
The first essay (Chapter 2) looks at the labor market returns to increased ed-
ucational attainment—brought about by the elimination of conscription policy in
France. While, the general consensus in the literature is that more education leads
to better lifetime outcomes, we provide evidence suggesting that this is not always
the case. Specifically, we find that an increase in the quantity of education, due
to draft avoidance behavior, does not necessarily lead to positive labor market out-
comes. While education has positive effects in general, these results suggest that we
should be wary of certain policies that induce individuals to attain more education
than desired.
The second essay (Chapter 3) looks at the effects of increased access to better
quality higher education on labor market outcomes for the low-skilled student. Pre-
vious research has documented significant gains from attending the most selective
postsecondary institutions. However, less is known about the extent to which these
gains are realized for the low skilled student who does not necessarily attend the
most selective of institutions. We find a substantial wage premium for academically
marginal students who attend better quality post secondary education characterized
by better performing peers and increased enrollment in STEM majors. Specifically,
we uncover a 13.6 percent wage premium attributed to increased access to higher
quality schooling. This suggests that policies geared towards increasing lower skilled
students’ access to better quality education can result in significant labor market
gains.
The final essay (Chapter 4) looks at the effect of increased access to better quality
high schools on short run academic performance. Specifically, we find substantial test
score gains from attending elite high schools which in turn translates into improved
2
college outcomes. Strikingly, these results do not extend to better quality institutions
that are not designated as tier-1 schools, indicating that academic gains are only
realized for those attending the best of institutions. This finding holds despite the
fact that attending both types of institutions leads to a similar increase in the average
quality of peers. We provide for suggestive evidence indicating that these results are
driven by teacher quality as opposed to peer quality, indicating that teacher quality
may matter more for cognitive outcomes.
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2. CONSCRIPTION AND THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION: EVIDENCE
FROM A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY
2.1 Introduction
There has been considerable interest in analyzing the consequences of compulsory
military service on a wide array of outcomes. These include earnings (Angrist, 1990;
Angrist & Krueger, 1994; Angrist & Chen, 2011), education (Card & Lemieux,
2001), crime (Galiani et al., 2011; Lindo & Stoecker, 2014) and health outcomes
(Bedard & Deschenes, 2006; Conley & Heerwig, 2012). This is in part due to the
general policy interest in understanding shocks that are expected to have large and
persistent long run effects on outcomes. Indeed, conscripted individuals are obliged
to serve in a crucial time of their lives, usually characterized by critical human capital
investments. Moreover, the mechanics underlying these early adulthood shocks are
themselves of considerable interest. For example, the military service and disruption
caused by conscription may directly have long run effects on labor market outcomes.
Alternatively, conscription may instead affect long run outcomes through its effect
on educational attainment, since continuing one’s education can typically allow one
to defer mandatory military service. Finally, understanding the effects of compulsory
military service has direct policy implications for countries that still have such policies
in place.1
This chapter focuses on the effects of a peacetime conscription shock on the
education and labor market outcomes of young French males. Prior to 1997, all
French male citizens had to undergo a 10 month compulsory military service at
the age of 18. A lot of men preferred to defer their service, and the best way
1In Europe: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Norway, and Switzerland all still
require their citizens to undergo mandatory military service.
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to do so was by staying enrolled in an educational institution. In May of 1996, the
French government announced that people born after January 1, 1979 were no longer
required to enlist, while those born prior to that were still required to do so. This
enables us to use a regression discontinuity design framework that compares across
cohorts that were barely subject to or exempted from mandatory military service.
Since there is no reason to believe the outcomes of these groups would have been
different absent this conscription policy, this research design allows us to overcome
the selection bias in who is deemed physically and mentally fit for military service.
Results indicate that males born just before January 1, 1979 acquire on average
half a year of education more than those born just after January 1, 1979, which is
consistent with draft avoidance behavior. Specifically, this result is driven by in-
dividuals from high socioeconomic backgrounds. However, the additional years of
education do not translate to degree completion; we find no discontinuity in percent-
age of degrees attained at the high school or college level. Strikingly, we also find
no significant effect on employment or future earnings. The results are robust to
different bandwidths and estimation procedures.
We then analyze several competing hypotheses as to why conscription would
increase years of education but not earnings. On the one hand, if conscription has no
direct effect on earnings, then our results imply zero returns to schooling. This could
be the case if the average marginal return to education for those who were on the
verge of dropping out of education is low, or because any positive returns to education
in France may be mostly due to sheepskin effects and signaling, rather than human
capital accumulation.2 On the other hand, if we believe that conscription has a direct
negative effect on earnings, reasonable assumptions regarding the magnitude of that
2Of course, difference in ability to complete a degree may also reflect a difference in human
capital acquisition.
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effect from the existing literature, this results in returns to education estimates of 2.5
to 5 percent. Additional evidence provides support for the zero returns to education
hypothesis.
In addressing the impacts of conscription on education and labor market out-
comes, this paper joins a growing body of research on peacetime conscription. Im-
bens & Van der Klauw (1995) focus on the labor market effects brought about by
peacetime conscription in the Netherlands and find a 5 percent negative return to
earnings as a result of military service. They attribute this result to the correspond-
ing loss of labor market experience. Galiani et. al (2011) uncover a negative earnings
effect brought about by serving in the Argentinian military service. They conclude
that this helps explain the documented increase in draftees’ criminal behavior. On
the other hand, Card & Cardoso (2012) find evidence of positive military service
effects on earnings. Specifically, they find a 4-5 percent increase in the wages of men
with only primary education in Portugal. Cipollone & Rosolia (2007) focus on the
educational effects of conscription and find that exemption from service lead to a 3
percentage point reduction in high school graduation rates in Italy. Di Pietro (2009)
also analyzes the educational effect of conscription in Italy by looking at university
enrollment. The paper finds evidence of heterogeneous enrollment effects based on
socioeconomic status. Grenet et al. (2011) and Bauer et al. (2012) examine the
effect of peacetime military service on the long run earnings of post World War II
conscripts in England and Germany respectively. Both papers use regression discon-
tinuity designs based on year and day of birth respectively and find no evidence of
a long run earnings effect to conscription. Further, Grenet et al. (2011) uncover no
evidence of draft avoidance behavior in terms of increased educational attainment in
England, whereas Bauer et al. (2014) find that this behavior did exist in Germany.
Our paper is most similar to Maurin & Xenogiani (2007) who examine the effect
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of conscription policy on both labor market and educational outcomes in France.
They find that this policy leads to an increase in educational attainment, graduation
rates and earnings. This study differs from Maurin & Xenogiani (2007) in several
ways. First, we use the official birth date of January 1, 1979 as the cutoff for
military service eligibility, whereas their study incorporates individuals born in 1978
in addition to 1979 in the treatment group. Second, we use a RD design which
relies on less stringent assumptions as compared to a differences in difference model
that compares across genders, which could be problematic to the extent that the
educational decisions of men may affect those of women in a general equilibrium
framework.3 Third, we look at wages for individuals in their early 30s, which could
potentially be more informative than entry wages examined in that paper. As a
result, both papers reach different conclusions. More specifically, while we both
uncover evidence of draft avoidance in terms of years of schooling, our paper finds
no evidence of a conscription effect on either graduation rates or earnings, which
contrasts significantly with their study.4
This paper makes several contributions relative to the existing literature. First,
we present estimates that speak to the impact of conscription policy on both educa-
tion and labor market outcomes. Particularly, we do so using a compelling research
design that enables us to estimate the causal impact of conscription policy under
assumptions that are less stringent than for many other research designs. This ap-
pears to be important, as this design yields no evidence of graduation effects or an
3See, for example, the literature on gender classroom composition and educational outcomes
(Hoxby (2000); Lavy & Schlosser (2011); Black et al. (2013).
4We must acknowledge however that a direct comparison of both papers, specifically with re-
spect to earnings estimates, could potentially be problematic. Differences in labor market outcome
estimates across both studies may be attributed to conscription having a differential affect on early
career wages for males in their early 20’s versus longer term wages for those in their mid 30’s. This
is consistent with Angrist (1990); Angrist and Chen (2011) who initially finds a negative earnings
impact to military service in the short run with these effects dissipating over time in the long run.
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earnings premium, which contrasts with previous work on the impact of conscription
in France. In addition, because this study examines the impact of conscription using
recent data on a relatively young cohort, it is particularly relevant for those countries
in Western Europe that are considering changing their conscription policies.
This paper also adds to the much broader literature on education. Existing stud-
ies on the returns to education have mostly focused on exogenous variations in the
supply of schooling and have generally found a positive returns to education (See
Card (1999) for a survey of the literature). This paper focuses on a policy that
induced variation in educational attainment through an increase in the demand for
education. More specifically, conscription policy gave students an added incentive
to pursue education—independent of the usual incentives to acquire more educa-
tion. We find that the marginal student induced into acquiring education, due to
conscription, does not seem to benefit from this added education. Specifically, while
education has positive effects in general, we should still be wary of certain policies
that induce individuals to attain more schooling than they would have had if it were
up to them. This is consistent with recent findings by Pischke & Von Wachter (2008)
and Grenet (2013) who document zero to little returns to education using variation
from compulsory schooling laws in Germany and France respectively.
2.2 Mandatory military service and subsequent reforms
France was the first modern state to introduce military conscription as a condition
of citizenship during the French Revolution. It did so through the decree of the
Jourdan Act of 1798 which stated “Any Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to
the defense of the nation.” Conscription continued in various forms over the next
200 years until finally being phased out between 1996 and 2002. Individuals were
called up for national service at age 18. In theory, one could postpone his service
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until the age of 22 without justification, though this was not usually done in practice.
Instead, delaying conscription through acquiring extra education was the preferred
route for several reasons. First, getting a full time job before conscription would
require looking for a job twice. Second, more educated conscripts had access to higher
responsibilities and milder forms of service. Further, staying on in education till the
age of 26 allowed you to potentially avoid service all together. Finally, the abundance
of low cost public schools, universities and technical/vocational institutions in France
made it relatively easy to prolong education. In fact, Maurin & Xenogiani (2007)
show that approximately two thirds of individuals enrolled in military service at time
t, were still in school at t-1, whereas about 20% were unemployed and only 8% held
permanent employment. They also show that the proportion of conscripts serving
in the military aged 20 or older was 64%, with 90% of high school graduates serving
after age 20.
International criticism over the performance of French deployed soldiers during
the Gulf War caused the government to rethink their military service composition.
This prompted a national wide debate over whether or not national defense should
be left to the hands of professionals only. On February 22, 1996, President Jacques
Chirac dramatically restructured the French army with the intent of having fully
professional armed forces by 2002. This was eventually formalized in November of
1997. The reform law granted national service exemption to men born after January
1, 1979. During the 1997-2002 transition period, men born before January 1979
were still required to perform 10 months of service. Compulsory military service was
completely eliminated by a resolution adopted at the Cabinet meeting on June 27,
2001 which finally exempted those born before January 1, 1979 as well. The way
these reforms were set up provides for an ideal quasi-experimental setup to test for
the effects of conscription policy on education and future labor market outcomes.
9
Table A1 shows male conscription rates by birth cohort—taken from the ‘Gener-
ation 1998 a` 10 ans’ individual level survey. One limitation of this survey is that it
only includes individuals with specific ties to the year 1998; whether these individu-
als are representative of France more broadly is an open question.5 Table 1 indicates
that around 50 percent of all males born between 1974 and 1976 eventually served
in the military.6 These numbers are consistent with those published by the French
ministry of defense. They report that the number of conscripts during the early
1990’s was stable at around 200,000 individuals per year implying that about 50%
of a given birth cohort performed their national service duties.7 The conscription
rate drops to 37 and 27 percent for birth cohorts 1977 and 1978 respectively. This
drop is consistent with the way conscription was abolished in France. Individuals
born in 1977 and 1978 were more likely to be exempt from service given that the
system of conscription was fully abolished in August 2001.8 Figure A1 affirms that
the elimination of conscription induced sharp cross cohort variation in conscription
rates around the January 1, 1979 serving threshold. Individuals born just before the
cutoff were 23 percentage points more likely to have served in the military. Addi-
tionally, Table A1 also reveals that males from different socioeconomic backgrounds
(S.E.S) were not serving at disproportionate levels. More specifically, conscription
5The criteria for being included in Generation 1998 are as follows:
1) Enrollment in an educational institution in France in 1997-1998 or having left the education
system in 1998. 2) No interruption in one’s education exceeding a year (except for reasons of
health, national service). 3) Having not returned to school during the year following entry into the
labor market 4) Being at most 35 years old in the year 1998. 5) Being in France at the time of the
survey.
6General exemptions were given to males with mental or health issues. Other possible exemptions
include married men who had children and whose spouses had limited resources, family members
of military martyrs, non-citizens as well as individuals with dual citizenship who had lived abroad
for a significant portion of time.
7After the announcement of the military reform law in 1996 the number of individuals serving
in the military gradually dropped from around 200,000 in 1996 to zero in 2002.
8If these cohorts stayed on in education till the ages of 23 and 24 respectively, then they would
be permanently exempt from serving.
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rates—averaged for cohorts 1974 to 1978—were similar with 45.2% of individuals
from low S.E.S and 44.2% of individuals from high S.E.S serving in the military.
These numbers drop to zero for individuals from both subgroups born after 1979.
This alleviates concerns attributed to differential selection into conscription based
on socioeconomic background.
2.3 Data and sample construction
The data used in this paper come from the 2011 French Labor Force Survey (LFS)
conducted by the Institut de la Statistique et des E´tudes E´conomiques (INSEE).9
We focus on the 2011 LFS as it offers the most up-to-date earnings data for this
study. The LFS covers private households in metropolitan France. Participation
in the survey is compulsory and has a high response rate of about 81%. As of
2003, a survey sample rotation of 6 quarters has been adapted. As a result, each
household is interviewed for six consecutive quarters with the first and sixth quarters’
interviews being conducted in person and the others done over the phone. The
weighting factor applied to the survey is the population total (15 years or older) less
the estimated number of people living in communities. The 2011 LFS surveys about
420,000 individuals with a sampling rate of about 1/150 of the total population.
It provides information on individuals’ month-year of birth, sex, educational level,
occupational status, fathers’ occupation, hours worked and wages.
From the original sample of 420,000 observations, we drop all females and non-
French citizens. We further restrict the sample to people born within 48 months on
either side of January 1, 1979. Descriptive statistics for the remaining 8,117 French
male citizens born between 1975 and 1982 are reported in Table A2. Respondents
have an average of 14.77 years of education, which corresponds to the number of
9Data Sources: Enquete de emploi 2011 et Generation 1998 a` 10 ans. [fichier electronique],
INSEE [producteur], Centre Maurice Hallbwachs (CMH) [diffuseur].
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years individuals are observed within educational institutions.10 The average net
monthly earnings for individuals in the sample (as of 2011) is 1681 Euros and the
employment rate is 90.7%. Further, the average reported hourly wage is 12.27 Euros
with an average workweek of 41 hours. The graduation rate for high school is 67%,
and for college it is 24%.11 For a detailed illustration of the available educational
routes in the high school and higher education system, refer to Appendix Figures A2
and A3. Importantly, these figures highlight the fact that there were many different
routes available to students wishing to extend their stay in either traditional or voca-
tional schooling. Finally, we rely on fathers’ occupation as a proxy for socioeconomic
status (S.E.S) and find that 33% of individuals are classified as being from a high
S.E.S. Particularly, occupation type is stratified into 355 different positions compro-
mised of four digit identifiers in the LFS. This corresponds to the official French
socioeconomic classification as represented by the Nonmenclature des professions et
categories socioprofessionelles (PCS) and is used as reference in all official collective
agreements. The first digit of each occupation makes it possible to identify the set
of occupations that share the same position in the hierarchy of wages and education.
More specifically, the first digit represents the four main skill levels used in official
collective agreements.12 Following Maurin & Thesmar (2004), our definition of high
skilled workers includes the first two groups (a and b), while low skilled workers are
in the last two (c and d).
10Children in France usually start schooling at age 6. Further, there are different educational
routes for schooling in France (professional, technical, academic) and this variable does not distin-
guish between the types.
11We include both the professional/technical and general baccalaureate in my graduating from
high school variable. College graduation is defined as graduating with a lice`nse (the equivalent of
a four year degree in the U.S.)
12The four main skill levels are as follows: a) cadres(mostly upper level managers, engineers and
professionals); b) profession interme´diare (lower level managers and professionals, supervisors, and
technicians); c) ouvriers et employe´s qualifie´s (skilled manual and non-manual workers); d) ouvriers
et employe´s non qualifie´s (low skill manual and non-manual workers).
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2.4 Identification strategy
We use a standard regression discontinuity framework (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008;
Lee & Lemieux, 2010) to estimate the effects of the abolishment of conscription on
educational attainment as well as future earnings. The key assumption underlying an
RD design is that the conditional expectation of the outcome variable with respect
to birth cohort month-year (the running variable) is smooth through the January 1,
1979 birth cutoff. Intuitively, this means that all other determinants of outcomes
must be smooth across the cutoff. This is likely to hold, as precisely manipulating
one’s date of birth in such a short time period is highly unlikely. Moreover, no
other policy changes were occurring at the birth cohort threshold. To support these
claims, we show that there is no evidence of bunching around the threshold, that
observed determinants of education and earnings are smooth across the threshold and
that treatment estimates do not significantly change with the addition of covariates.
Accordingly, any discontinuity observed in 1979 can be attributed to the causal effect
of being born before January 1, 1979, and thus being subject to the mandatory
conscription policy. Formally, we estimate the following reduced form equation:
Yi = α + f(Bi) + τDi + ΘDi ∗ f(Bi) + δXi + i
Where the dependent variable Y is the outcome of interest. D is a dummy variable
indicating whether a person belongs to a pre-reform cohort or not (i.e. being born
before January 1, 1979). B is an individual’s month-year birth cohort measured in
months relative to the cutoff date of Jan 1, 1979. The function f(.) captures the
underlying relationship between the running variable and the dependent variable.
Further, we allow the slopes of the fitted lines to differ on either side of the 1979
cutoff by interacting f(.) with the treatment dummy D. X is a vector of controls that
should improve precision by reducing residual variation in the outcome variable,
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but should not significantly change the treatment estimate. The term  represents
unobservable factors affecting outcomes. The parameter of interest is τ which gives
us the treatment effect for each regression.
We use population survey weights in order to estimate the treatment parameter
τ for the various outcomes.13 Further, standard errors are clustered at the month-
year level as suggested in Lee & Card (2008).14 There are two ways to estimate the
parameter τ . First, one can choose a parametric function for f(.) (eg. a quadratic
or quartic polynomial in B) and use all the data available to estimate the equa-
tion above via ordinary least squares—typically referred to as the global polynomial
approach. Alternatively, one can specify f(.) to be a linear function of B and es-
timate the equation over a narrower range of data, using a local linear regression.
The latter approach can be viewed as generating estimates that are more local to
the threshold and does not impose any strong functional assumptions on the data.
While the preferred specifications in this paper are drawn from local linear regres-
sions using uniform kernel weights, we still present results for a variety of bandwidths
and functional forms, as has become standard in the RD literature (Lee & Lemieux,
2010).
In what follows, we rely on intent to treat (ITT) estimates and only report reduced
form results. The reason we do so is twofold: First, the discontinuity in conscription
rates at the cutoff does not really affect educational outcomes as it is eligibility for
conscription rather than conscription in itself that drives those results. Second, re-
weighing the reduced form estimates for labor market outcomes by the discontinuity
in conscription rates in a Two Sample Two-Stage Least Squares framework (TS2SLS)
13Coefficients vary slightly when running un-weighted regressions, but significance decisions re-
main unchanged
14When the treatment determining covariate is discrete, reliance on functional form for estima-
tion becomes more critical. Clustering at the level of the discrete running variable accounts for
uncertainty in the choice of functional form for RD designs with discrete support.
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relies on a tenuous exclusion restriction, seeing as conscription eligibility has a dual
effect on education and earnings.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Education
We first examine the impact of mandatory conscription on years of education.15
The results are shown in Panels A and B of Figure 1. These figures take the same
form as those after them in that the open circles represent local averages over a 3
month period.
Panels A and B of Figure A4 depict a clear discontinuity in years of education
for French male citizens around the Jan 1, 1979 threshold date. Panel A uses a
population weighted quadratic fit with standard errors clustered at the month-year
level. We use a bandwidth of 108 months on either side of the cutoff and estimate a
significant discontinuity of 0.35 extra years of education attributed to being eligible
for conscription. The trends in the global polynomial figures can be explained by
the relative age of individuals in the sample. Relatively older cohorts to the far left
of the cutoff systematically have less education.16 Further, younger cohorts to the
far right of the cutoff may still be in school. Panel B fits the data over a narrower
bandwidth of 23 months using a local linear regression. Results indicate a significant
0.62 increase in years of education.17 The optimal bandwidth for the local linear
regression was selected using a robust data driven procedure (Henceforth CCT).18
15One may worry that the presence of too many people returning to education after military
service would cause us to overstate any education effects. However, Maurin & Xenogiani (2005)
show that only 4% of people who were in conscription at time t-1 pursued education at time t.
16The Labor force survey indicates that both males and females born during that period had
lower educational attainment as compared to relatively younger generations
17The results from the global polynomial and local linear regressions are not statistically different
from each other.
18As outlined in Calonico, Cattaneo & Titiunik (forthcoming), this bandwidth selector improves
upon previous selectors that yield large bandwidths. Specifically, it accounts for bias-correction
stemming from large initial bandwidth choice, while also correcting for the poor finite sample
15
We also report local linear estimates over a wide array of bandwidths as to avoid
over-reliance on a specific bandwidth choice, the results of which can be found in
Panel C of Figure A4.
Corresponding regression estimates are shown in Table A3. All standard errors
are clustered at the month-year level. Panel A depicts discontinuity estimates using
different bandwidths and functional forms without the addition of controls. These
estimates range from 0.41 to 0.62 years of extra education and are all statistically
significant at the 5% level. The addition of controls does not significantly change the
estimates, which is consistent with the identifying assumption. The controls used
include birth month fixed effects—when the bandwidth chosen contains more than a
year of data, a binary variable indicating whether an individual was ever enrolled in
middle school and father’s occupation. Treatment estimates with controls are shown
in Panel B and range from 0.35 to 0.55 years of education and are also statistically
significant at the 5% level. In Figures A5 and A6 of the appendix, we account
for the addition of these exogenous controls by plotting the residuals from years
of education regressions. We conclude that conscription policy lead to a 6-month
increase in education for young French males. These results are in line with a draft
avoidance hypothesis (i.e. acquiring extra education to avoid military service).
Next, we examine whether this increase in years of education resulted in an
increase in degree attainment, as measured by high school and college graduation
rates.19 Figures A7 and A8 show no evidence of a discontinuity in either college
(0.0267) or high school (0.0034) graduation rates using a quartic fit over a bandwidth
performance attributed to this bias correction. For instance, the LS-CV approach as outlined in
Imbens & Lemieux (2008) gives an optimal bandwidth of 29 months.
19The French education system includes different types of high school degrees ranging from the
professional/technical to the more traditional education route (The general baccalaureate). All
these routes have been accounted for in the graduating from high school variable. We also check
for discontinuities at the masters/doctorate level and find none.
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of 108 months. Table A4 depicts estimates for varying bandwidths and functional
forms, with all results remaining statistically insignificant. In summary, we find that
while mandatory conscription significantly increases years of education, it does not
increase the likelihood of receiving a degree at the high school or college level.
2.5.2 Labor market outcomes
We now turn to whether this increase in education quantity for those barely sub-
ject to conscription yields positive labor market returns. First, we check to see if
this policy generated any sharp changes in the likelihood of employment. All regres-
sions in Figure A9 use a population weighted quadratic fit over 108 months of data
on either side of the Jan. 1, 1979 cutoff. In Panel A, we find an insignificant 1.9
percentage point change in employment rates for those who were barely eligible for
conscription.20 Corresponding regression estimates are shown in Panel A of Table
A5 with standard errors again clustered at the month-year level. The treatment
estimates for likelihood of employment remain statistically insignificant over a wide
range of bandwidths and functional forms. We conclude that being eligible for con-
scription does not seem to have significantly affected the likelihood of employment.
Next, we look at whether there are any significant effects on earnings for those
barely subject to conscription. We begin by looking at monthly wages that include
zero earners. Panel B of Figure A9 depicts an insignificant discontinuity in monthly
earnings to the order of 51 Euros per month. Results remain unchanged when using
logged earnings as the dependent variable and consequently dropping all zero earn-
ers from the sample. Panel C of Figure A9 depicts an insignificant 1.5 percentage
point intensive margin change in monthly earnings. Finally, one may worry about
whether monthly wages are not properly measuring effective salary dynamics due to
20We also re-estimate the global polynomial using a cubic and quartic fit and reach the same
conclusion.
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behavioral responses in hours worked. We check for this by looking at any treatment
effects on hourly wages. As can be seen from Panel D, we find no such effects and
conclude that there are no significant changes in average earnings brought about by
conscription. Corresponding regression estimates for all labor market outcomes are
shown in Table A5. The results remain statistically insignificant over varying band-
widths and functional forms. We conclude that the conscription policy had no effect
on labor market outcomes, despite the significant increase in years of education that
it caused.
To assess conscription eligibility effects on the distribution of earnings as opposed
to just average earnings, we also run quantile treatment effect regressions on monthly
earnings for the whole population of interest. We estimate treatment effects on the
probability of having earnings in each of 9 exhaustive groups. The quantile treatment
effects suggest insignificant estimates at all deciles of the income distribution, which
are consistent with the average treatment effects. Results are presented in Figure
A10 of the appendix.
2.5.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects
While the above results show that conscription policy increases years of education
on average, there are reasons to believe that some men should be more affected than
others. For instance, individuals from wealthier backgrounds may find it easier to
support themselves if they choose to prolong education. Thus, in order to comple-
ment the initial results, we look at treatment effects for individuals from high versus
low socioeconomic backgrounds to assess if one was differentially affected by this
policy.21 Table A6 depicts results for global polynomial and local linear estimates.
The bandwidth varies with each outcome variable when reporting the local linear
21Differential selection into mandatory conscription by socioeconomic status could potentially
bias these results. However, as shown in Table A1, we find no evidence of this.
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estimates which are again chosen by the CCT bandwidth selector.
Results indicate that there is no significant change in added years of education for
low S.E.S individuals, as can be seen in columns 1 and 3 of Table A6. In contrast, we
find that high S.E.S individuals take on significantly more education. Specifically, in
columns 5 and 7, we estimate a significant treatment effect to the order of 0.57 and
0.96 years of education, depending on the estimation procedure used. These results
are consistent with a priori expectations, seeing as resources play an integral role in
prolonging one’s education.22 However, treatment effects on high school and college
graduation rates remain statistically insignificant for both subgroups. This suggests
that even though individuals from more aﬄuent backgrounds were taking on more
education, this did not affect the average graduation rate of this subpopulation. As
for labor market outcomes, there are no significant treatment effects on the likelihood
of employment for either group. We also estimate a zero treatment effect for the two
subgroups with respect to monthly, hourly, and logged wages. We conclude that
mandatory military service has no effect on labor market outcomes for individuals
from both spectra of the socioeconomic realm, even though it induced individuals
from high S.E.S to take on more education.
2.5.4 Robustness checks
In this section, We test the reliability and validity of the identification strategy
used. One advantage of a RD design is that there are several tests that allow us
to indirectly test the plausibility of the research design. For instance, non-random
sorting of individuals to either side of the January 1, 1979 birth cutoff would cause
identification issues. Specifically, if individuals are strategically sorting to the right
of the threshold in order to avoid conscription, and if this sorting is correlated with
22These costs can be direct (tuition, books, transportation, etc...) or indirect (opportunity cost
of not being employed).
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future outcomes, then the estimated treatment effects would be biased. However,
manipulation of birth certificates would be an extremely hard thing to achieve in a
developed nation such as France. Moreover, the fact that this policy was announced
in 1996 makes it hard to believe that people would be able to manipulate birth
documents in such a short period of time with such ease. Figure A11 depicts the
distribution of observations in the sample, with no large mass evident to the right of
the cutoff.23
Another informative visual test of manipulation involves testing for the smooth-
ness of predetermined characteristics that are known to affect both earnings and
education. The intuition here is that if we observe any discontinuity in exogenous
characteristics, then this could be the result of strategic sorting by individuals or
evidence of another policy occurring at the threshold. We test for this by examining
where there is a documented discontinuity in fathers’ occupation or in middle school
enrollment rates.24 Results depicted in Figures A12 and A13 confirm that there is
no significant discontinuity in either of these baseline covariates. The robustness of
these results to varying bandwidths and functional forms are presented in Table A7.
In addition, we perform several falsification exercises. We start by checking for
discontinuities among females, who did not have to serve in the military. Specifi-
cally, we worry about there also being any positive treatment effects for females born
just before the cutoff date. If males and females born just before Jan.1, 1979 both
experience a significant and positive shock, then one may be concerned about some
23There is slight variation from month to month which is easily explained by the nature of the
data (survey) and by the fact that data was trimmed by removing females, non-citizens, individuals
living abroad, etc...
24Middle school enrollment rates should not be affected by the policy since those students are
not yet eligible for conscription. Further, we do not focus on middle school graduation rates as
that variable could potentially be endogenous to treatment in a dynamic choice model, seeing that
passing the Brevet exam (middle school exit exam) or its equivalent is needed to stay enrolled in
high school education and potentially delay one’s service.
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other policy driving the results. Panels A to F of Figure A14 confirm that there
is no discontinuity in years of education, graduation rates, employment or wages
for young French females. To investigate the robustness of these global polynomial
estimates, we report all outcomes over varying bandwidths and functional forms in
Table A8. All outcomes remain statistically insignificant except for high school grad-
uation. High school graduation treatment effects yield a significant discontinuity in
most specifications ranging from -4.8 to -8.2 percentage points. Even though these
results are not robust to various bandwidths, we cannot reject the existence of a sig-
nificant and negative treatment effect in the likelihood of graduating from high school
for females born just before the cutoff. The two most plausible explanations for this
effect are as follows: First, there may have been another exogenous shock—specific
to the conscription birth date threshold—that negatively affected the high school
graduation rate of both genders. This would cause us to potentially understate high
school graduation effects for young males subject to conscription. To the best of our
knowledge, no such policy relative to that specific birth cohort exists.25 An alterna-
tive, and more likely scenario, is that the increase in female high school graduation
rates for those born after the cutoff date may be the result of peer effects stemming
from gender composition in the classroom. That is, having less males remain in
educational capacities would automatically lead to an increase in the proportion of
females in the classroom. This could ultimately influence the educational perfor-
mance of females in the classroom. This is consistent with Black et al. (2013) who
find that teenage schooling outcomes are influenced by the proportion of females in
the grade, with effects differing by gender. These results also highlight a serious
pitfall in using a difference-in-difference strategy, with females as the control group,
25We also check for discontinuities in high school graduation for both genders during the cutoff
years of 1977, 1978 and 1980 and find no significant effects.
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when analyzing the effects of conscription.
Finally, we check for discontinuities at pseudo cutoff dates around the original
threshold. To do so, we estimate treatment effects for 50 fake cutoff months on either
side of the real threshold. This placebo test is implemented using years of education
as the dependent variable since it is the only significant treatment effect found.
Results indicate that the real cutoff date provides for the largest and most significant
discontinuity. Figure A15 summarizes these findings by graphing t-statistics for these
various placebo cutoff dates. The zero cutoff point represents the real threshold with
all others being placebo estimates for months relative to the original being used as
simulated treatment.26 All significant estimates are highlighted in the graph with a
large red filled circle. It is comforting to know that the most significant treatment
effect occurs at the real cutoff month-year with a t-statistic of around 3. Further, we
observe another 5 significant estimates out of the remaining 100 fake cutoff months.27
These t-stats decrease the further we are from the real cutoff birth date. This provides
further evidence that the significant treatment effect on years of education is in fact
caused by conscription.
2.6 What does this mean for the returns to education?
So far we have estimated reduced form effects for both education and labor market
outcomes. We find evidence of a discontinuity in years of education, but not in the
probability of getting a high school or college degree. Further, there are no significant
effects on labor market outcomes. However, because conscription can have its own
effect on labor market outcomes, interpreting these results as evidence for the lack
of returns to education would only be true under certain assumptions. Below, we
26Each month represents a local linear regression of bandwidth = 24 months using years of
education as the dependent variable.
27This is consistent with a Type-1 error of 5%
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present a simple conceptual framework that allows us to draw the distinction between
“traditional” and “conscription confounded” returns to education estimates.
To simplify, let us assume that birth date (B) is the only factor that determines
eligibility (e) and that e and conscription (C) are continuous variables over the real
line.28 Further, assume that schooling (S = S(e)) is an increasing function of eligibil-
ity.29 Finally, assume that wage (W = W(S(e), C(e)) is a function of schooling and
conscription.
By a simple application of the chain rule, the reduced form effect of conscription
eligibility on wages can be decomposed into a schooling effect and a conscription
effect:
dW
de
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∂W
∂S
∗ dS
de
+
∂W
∂C
∗ dC
de
(2.1)
Rearranging (1):
ReturnstoSchooling =
∂W
∂S
=
(dW
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− ∂W
∂C
∗ dC
de
)
dS
de
(2.2)
Consistent with the previous literature on the topic, we focus on two general
cases. Conscription can either have a zero or negative effect on wages.30
Case1 : ∂W
∂C
= 0
Assuming that serving in the military (C) has no direct effect on wages, equation
2.2 reduces to a traditional returns to education interpretation and is just the ratio
28For ease of computation, think of conscription and eligibility as probabilities on a continuous
scale from 0 to 1 as opposed to a binary variable.
29The assumption imposes the constraint of conscription in itself having no direct effect on edu-
cation, which is a reasonable one to make seeing that only 4 % of students ever return to education
after having served.
30In fact, almost all French individuals interviewed in a recent study agreed that there were
no advantages to be gained from including military service experience on your curriculum vitae
(Jorgensen & Breitenbauch (2009).
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of reduced form estimates for wages and years of education. Put differently, this
is equivalent to using date of birth as an instrument for education to estimate a
local average treatment effect (LATE) for the returns to education. From the results
section, we know that dW
de
= 0 indicating that the results point to no labor market
returns for half a year of education. This result is consistent with findings by Pischke
& Von Wachter (2008) and Grenet (2013) who document zero to minor returns to
education using variation from compulsory schooling laws in Germany and France
respectively. The former study concludes that the skills most relevant for the labor
market are learned early on in Germany. On the other hand, Grenet (2013) provide
an explanation based on academic credentials. Particularly, they document that
countries such as England and Wales witnessed a surge in graduation rates after
increasing the age of compulsory schooling, whereas no such effect was documented
in France. They hypothesize that policies that do not induce an uptake in academic
credentials may not necessarily result in positive returns to education.
One explanation for the lack of educational returns in this study is that the av-
erage marginal return to education for those who were on the verge of dropping
out of education is low. That is, the type of education induced by draft avoidance
is of a lower quality than typical education or the marginal student induced into
education exerts less effort. Alternatively, since this increase in years of education
for the eligible group is not accompanied by a significant increase in college or high
school graduation rates, then perhaps the results could be attributed to the value of
signaling in education. The latter scenario is consistent with Grenet (2013) and sug-
gests that most of the returns to education for the population of interest seem to be
stemming from sheepskin effects (signaling) as opposed to human capital acquisition
in the form of additional years of education.
Case2 : ∂W
∂C
< 0
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Assuming that conscription has a negative effect on wages, then equation 2.2
no longer simplifies to a traditional returns to education interpretation. However,
a bound for plausible returns to education estimates can be derived from equation
2.2. We know that ˆdW
de
= 0 and dˆS
de
= 0.5. The compliance ratio can be estimated
at dˆC
de
≈ 50%.31 Further, previous returns to conscription literature, that have found
negative effects to conscription, point to a ∂W
∂C
≈ 2.5% − 5% negative returns to
conscription. Plugging these estimates into equation (2), we estimate a bound to
the order of ∂W
∂S
≈ 2.5% − 5% returns to an additional year of education for the
population of interest.32
In order to shed light on which of these possible interpretations is more likely
to be true, we look at two subgroups whose education decisions are exogenous to
treatment. As highlighted in section 2.5.3, there is no threshold crossing effect on
education for individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds. On the other hand,
we observe a treatment effect on years of education for individuals coming from high
socioeconomic backgrounds. However, both these groups experience no significant
labor market treatment effects. As a result, and under the assumption of homoge-
neous conscription effects, serving does not seem to be directly affecting labor market
outcomes.33
To complement these results, we also look at another subpopulation whose educa-
31Some may question why this number is at odds with the conscription rates for the years 1978
and 1979—reported in Table 1. As mentioned in section 2, one of the criteria for inclusion in the
Generation 1998 a` 10 ans survey is being in an educational institution in 1998. Thus, people who
were not in education in 1998 or who had not left education by 1998 are excluded from the sample.
These individuals likely have high service rates, which means Table 1 potentially underestimates
conscription rates for some cohorts. As a result, we rely on a less conservative estimate of 50% at
the cutoff.
32This bound is calculated assuming a compliance ratio of 50%. Assuming a more conservative
25% compliance ratio at the cutoff, the bound becomes 1.25%-2.5% returns to a year of education.
33If individuals from high S.E.S reap some direct economic benefit from conscription relative to
low S.E.S individuals, then this conclusion may not hold. However, the only cases in the literature
where conscription has shown to have a positive impact on earnings were for individuals from less
educated and/or disadvantaged backgrounds (Berger and Hirsch, 1983; De Tray, 1982).
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tion is orthogonal to treatment but who are ultimately still eligible for conscription.
Specifically, we restrict the data to people who have only completed primary school-
ing (i.e up to grade 6). These individuals’ decision to not remain in school should be
independent of conscription policy. Figure A16 confirms that there is no discontinu-
ity in years of education for this subgroup. As a result, any discontinuity in earnings
must be due to the effect of conscription itself, rather than to the combination of
military service and increased education. Results are shown in Figure A17, which
shows no effect on earnings. While these results are more suggestive than conclusive
given that we are focusing on a very specific subgroup of individuals, they reinforce
the conclusion that military service has no direct effect on earnings.
Additionally, the main hypothesized channel—in the conscription literature—
through which military service affects earnings is through a loss of early labor market
experience (Angrist, 1990; Imbens and Van Der Klauw, 1995). Figure A18 indicates
that conscription policy does not induce a loss of early job market experience despite
it leading to an increase in years of education. This finding is consistent with the
proposed evidence suggesting zero returns to military service for our population
of interest. Further, this also rules out the possibility that decreased job market
experience is negating any potential positive earnings stemming from the documented
increase in education. Altogether, our results suggest that the only potential effect
conscription policy could have on earnings is through its effect on education. We
conclude that the increased years of education observed in the original sample do
not yield positive labor market returns. As stated earlier, this could be because
the average marginal return of this type of education induced by conscription policy
does not increase human capital, or because the returns to education work primarily
through signaling rather than human capital accumulation.
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2.7 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the returns to conscription literature by exploiting
the abolition of mandatory military service in France in order to identify the effects
of conscription eligibility on education and future earnings. We use a regression
discontinuity design to overcome selection bias attributed to serving in the military.
We find that those barely eligible for conscription obtain approximately 6 additional
months of education as a result. Specifically, We find that this result is mainly
driven by individuals from high socioeconomic backgrounds. However, there are no
discontinuities in high school or college graduation rates, which suggests that the
individuals do not use the additional time in school to finish degrees. Furthermore,
We find no effects on employment rates, monthly, hourly or logged earnings. These
results are robust to varying bandwidths and functional forms.
We also contribute to the returns to education literature by presenting several
hypotheses that could plausibly be driving the above results. If we assume no direct
returns to serving in the military, then the ratio of the two reduced form effects yield
a zero estimate for returns to education. On the other hand, if we were to assume
negative returns to conscription, then the reduced form results do not simplify to
a traditional returns to education interpretation. Back of the envelope calculations
result in a bound of 2.5%- 5% returns to one year of education. Under the assump-
tion of homogeneous returns to conscription, we provide evidence to the lack of any
direct returns to conscription. This leans support to the zero returns to education
hypothesis. No returns to schooling could be interpreted in several ways. First, the
education induced by draft avoidance could be of lower quality than more typical ed-
ucation. Alternatively, since there is no increase in high school or college graduation
rates, then the results could be driven by signaling and sheepskin effects.
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These results have important implications. First, while it remains an open ques-
tion as to the extent to which these results would apply in other contexts, these
findings could provide some evidence on the potential effects of mandatory military
service in European countries that have yet to abolish such policies. Finally, we
should be wary about the possible consequences of certain policies that induce indi-
viduals to attain more schooling than they would have had if it were up to them. In
fact, a good portion of these individuals could probably be better served acquiring
early labor market experience. More specifically, while the returns to education for
non draft related reasons may still be positive, policies that aim to increase educa-
tional attainment without targeting the necessary complements of education need to
be looked at closer.
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3. QUALITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND EARNINGS: REGRESSION
DISCONTINUITY EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH BACCALAUREATE
3.1 Introduction
An emerging body of literature looks at whether quality of postsecondary educa-
tion has a significant impact on students’ future labor market outcomes. Previous
studies find large returns to the most selective institutions and degrees. However, it is
unclear whether these effects persist for academically marginal students who attend
mildly selective universities which differ in quality. This is an important question
as most students do not decide between attending an elite versus a non-elite uni-
versity. In fact, admission rates at most “Ivy League” institutions in the U.S. are
lower than 10%. In France, less than 4% of students in 2013 enrolled in preparatory
classes for elite universities. It is also of equal importance to understand how choice
of major within an institution can affect future labor market outcomes. Recent re-
ports suggest the presence of a persistent and growing wage premium for jobs in the
fields sof science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) (Langdon et
al., 2011). From a policy perspective, these fields are perceived to be the basis for
innovation and governments have been increasingly investing in STEM education.
Finally, there is also a need to understand the combined effect of university quality
and major choice, as students often make these decisions simultaneously.
This chapter looks at the impact of the quality of higher education on labor
market outcomes for the academically marginal student. In our context, quality
of higher education refers to both quality of university attended and field of study
pursued—where institution quality is proxied peer quality. This matters, as students
in most countries often decide on an institution and field of study simultaneously. To
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do so, we exploit a unique feature of the French education system, the Baccalaure´at
Ge´ne´ral or the General Baccalaureate.
The Baccalaureate is a national diploma granted to students in France upon
graduating from secondary school and is required for university enrollment. In order
to earn the degree, students have to sit for and pass national exit exams during
their last academic year. Students are generally given two attempts to pass these
“high stakes” exams within the same year. However, the standards for passing are
significantly higher in the first round. We use a regression discontinuity design that
compares the future educational and labor market outcomes of students who barely
pass and barely fail the exam from the first attempt. This allows us to overcome
selection bias arising from the fact that post-secondary educational choices are likely
correlated with unobservable factors that may also affect future earnings, such as
ability and motivation.
Results indicate that threshold crossing leads to an improvement in the average
peer quality that students are exposed to in college, to the order of 0.11 standard
deviations in Baccalaureate scores. We also find that marginally passing causes a
15.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of pursuing a STEM degree in any
university. Further, we uncover a 13.6 percent earnings premium associated with
threshold crossing, approximately 9 to 10 years after having initially taken the exam,
with no significant employment effects. We rule out other possible channels through
which threshold crossing may affect earnings. Specifically, we find no significant
effect on years of post-baccalaureate education, or on the likelihood of obtaining a
post-baccalaureate degree. Moreover, we find no discontinuity in the probability of
eventually obtaining the Baccalaureate degree. This rules out the direct signaling
value of the Baccalaureate degree as a potential channel that could have contributed
to the documented increase in earnings. Accordingly, we conclude that increased
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access to better quality postsecondary education raises earnings by 13.6 percent for
academically marginal students.
Our paper is related to a large body of literature that provides estimates on
the returns to quality of higher education. Dale and Krueger (2002, 2014) compare
students who were accepted at similar universities, but chose to attend different
colleges. They find that the earnings gains from more selective colleges are restricted
to students from low socio-economic backgrounds and minorities. Brewer et al.
(1999) and Black and Smith (2004, 2006) show that there are significant returns to
attending more selective universities. Our study is closest to more recent work which
uses regression discontinuity designs to identify the returns to quality and quantity of
education. Hoekstra (2009) finds that attending a flagship state university increases
earnings by 20 percent for white males. Saavedra (2009) uncovers an increase in
the earnings and employment rate of applicants who are marginally above the entry
cutoff at selective universities in Colombia. Zimmerman (2014) estimates the returns
to attending a four year university by comparing students who are marginally above
and below the admissions cutoff at the least selective university in Florida. Recent
studies also use regression discontinuity designs to estimate the returns to different
fields of study. Hastings et al. (2013) and Kirkbøen et al. (2014) exploit the existence
of varying admissions cutoffs to certain majors at selective universities in Chile and
Norway respectively. They find heterogeneous returns by field of study and positive
returns for the most selective of degrees.
We contribute to this literature in several ways. First, our focus is on universi-
ties that are moderately selective but which slightly differ in quality amongst each
other. In fact, students who marginally pass the General Baccalaureate exam do not
normally attend elite universities in France. This is in contrast to the rest of the lit-
erature which usually estimates the returns to the most selective universities. Thus,
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it is interesting to find that even among universities that are of moderate selectivity,
there are positive returns to attending a higher quality institution.
Furthermore, our estimates concern students with moderate academic abilities.
This is potentially important as the returns to college quality can be heterogeneous
(Andrews et al., 2012). Goodman et al. (2014) also focus on the benefits of higher
quality education for lower ability students. They use the admissions cutoffs at var-
ious universities in Georgia and find that marginally missing these cutoffs decreases
BA completion rates. However, they do not analyze any subsequent labor market
effects. Second, we examine the returns to quality of postsecondary education using
an entire national university system. Previous studies focused on the effects of at-
tending a single institution or a subset of universities within a country. Additionally,
our data allows us to track the complete educational paths for all students in our
sample.
Third, we estimate that at least part of the observed effect of marginally passing
on earnings is driven by pursuing STEM-designated degrees. We further provide
suggestive evidence that the returns to STEM education, holding quality of insti-
tution constant, is 43 percent for students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.
The magnitude of this effect is comparable to estimates from previous studies in
the U.S. Hamermesh and Donald (2008) estimate that the earnings of students who
majored in engineering and hard business are respectively, 31.6 and 48.9 log points
higher than those who majored in education. Altonji et al. (2012) suggest a wage
premium of 56.1 and 51.8 log points for those who studied electrical engineering and
finance relatively to education. Melguzio and Wozniak (2012) estimate a 25% to 40%
STEM related premium for high achieving minority students. Further, they find a
50% STEM premium for individuals who ended up working in a congruent field.
This paper is related to another strand of literature which explores the effects
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of educational accountability programs on student outcomes. Recent studies show
that the introduction of test-based accountability, like high school exit exams, in-
creases the performance of students who are still in school (Jacob, 2005; Figlio and
Rouse, 2006; Chiang, 2009). Other papers find that exit exams can increase high
school dropout rates (Ou, 2010; Papay et al., 2010) and even reduce post-secondary
educational attainment (Martorell, 2004).
We add to this literature in multiple ways. First, we find that marginally failing
the exit exams from the first attempt does not have an impact on graduating from
secondary school, graduating with a post-baccalaureate degree or years of educa-
tion. This suggests that exit exams do not necessarily discourage students through
increasing dropout rates and lowering higher educational attainment. In fact, when
high-stakes exams with multiple retakes are given, students may persist in order to
meet the graduation standards. In our case, this is reinforced by the fact that the
second round of exams has lower standards for passing than the first one.
Second, we find that exit exams can have consequences that have not yet been
considered in the literature. We show that marginally passing the exit exams from
the first attempt increases the likelihood of accessing higher quality postsecondary
education. This is due to either late enrollement in university/major combinations
that are in high demand, a discouragement or a signaling effect. In our setting,
the signaling effect explanation suggests that the timing of secondary school degree
receipt may be a better signal of ability than whether the student actually receives
the degree. In fact, allowing students to retake the exam with lower standards for
passing on the second round could be devaluing the high school credential. This
could partially explain recent findings that show that there is no signaling value to
a high school credential (see Clark and Martorell, 2014). If students are allowed
to retake exit exams until they eventually pass, employers and universities might
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question the true value of this credential.
3.2 Institutional background
3.2.1 The general baccalaureate
The Baccalaure´at Ge´ne´ral (or the General Baccalaureate) is a French national
degree awarded to students in their last year of secondary school. It marks the com-
pletion of secondary education and is also required for enrollment in postsecondary
institutions. Within the General Baccalaureate, students can choose one of three
specializations: economics & sociology, literature or sciences. Specializations differ
in terms of the subject matter that the curricula focus on. For instance, students
specializing in literature have a curriculum predominately focused on subjects such
as French literature and philosophy even though they are still required to take all
subjects.1 The percentage of students awarded the General Baccalaureate increased
from 67.2% in 1975 to 80.3% in 2002 and 92% in 2013.
In order to be awarded the degree, students must pass a series of national written
exams. The exams cover all subjects taken throughout the last academic year and are
common to all students within the same specialization. Written and oral exams for
the French literature section of the Baccalaureate are administered a year prior to all
other tests. Each subject has a different weight depending on student specialization.
The weighted average of all subjects is then used to compute the final score on the
Baccalaureate exam.
After the exams are administered, they are randomly assigned to preselected
secondary school teachers for grading. Two committees supervise the process to
guarantee uniform grading. Juries across France then meet to decide whether or not a
degree is conferred. Importantly, students’ identities remain anonymous throughout
1In the results section, we control for exam specialization fixed effects, and the results remain
unchanged.
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this whole process. In order to be awarded the degree, a student’s total weighted
score must be greater than or equal to 10 out of 20 possible points. The student
is also granted an Assez Bien (fairly good), Bien (good) or Tre`s Bien (very good)
distinction if he/she scores above a mark of 12, 14 and 16 respectively.
Students generally have two attempts to pass the exam in a given year. A stu-
dent who fails the initial attempt can opt to retake the exam in the second round,
conditional on scoring at least 8 points on the first try. With a total score below 8,
the student has to wait an additional year to retake the exam. Students select two
failing subjects to be retested on in the second round of exams. As a result, they
vary from one student to the other. The new grades on these two subjects are then
added back to the remaining grades from the first round to calculate a new total
score. The student is granted the degree if his/her new average score is greater than
or equal to 10. The second round exams of the Baccalaureate are often criticized
for being unchallenging and unreliable. This is mainly because they are conducted
orally and administered by only one teacher. This allows students to negotiate a
passing score with their respective teacher.
3.2.2 The jury
Following the grading of the first round exams, juries consisting of secondary
school teachers decide on the conferral of the degree. A key part of the jury’s role
is to determine whether a person who is marginally below a certain cutoff should be
given extra points to reach that threshold. If students are awarded the extra points,
their final score will be pushed to somewhere between X and X.1 points, where X
represents a significant threshold.2
2For example, if a student initially has a score of 9.95 and is deemed worthy of a pass, his/her
final posted grade will be between 10 and 10.1. In our dataset, we can only observe this final heaped
grade.
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Students are usually awarded extra points on the subjects for which they obtain
the lowest scores. The jury member who specializes in the corresponding subject
has to consent to giving the extra points. Decisions are made in a short period of
time as juries need to go through hundreds of applications on a given day. Further,
the juries tend to be fairly heterogeneous in their specializations. As a result, two
classmates who both marginally fail the Baccalaureate because of their scores on the
mathematics portion of the exam may be passed by one jury and not the other just
because the former had a teacher in mathematics, while the latter did not. Students
are not allowed to interact with jury members, nor do they know that their files are
being reviewed until after the results are announced. Furthermore, students’ names
are hidden from the jury throughout the whole process, as to hinder any cheating or
bribing.
The jury members observe students’ Baccalaureate exams in all subject matter.
They also have the option to access an academic report which contains teachers’
evaluations of the student’s performance in school. While this may raise concerns
over strategic jury behavior in the allocation of extra points, anecdotal evidence
suggests that this option is not always exercised. Furthermore, previous studies
show that the presence of test-based accountability distorts teacher behavior. For
example, Jacob and Levitt (2003) provide evidence of teacher cheating on the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills in Chicago elementary schools. Dee et al. (2011) also show that
teachers wanting to help their students, tend to inflate test scores on New York’s
high school assessment exams. In our case, it is possible that teachers’ desire to help
students might cause them to be more lenient in their evaluations. Thus, even if jury
members take into consideration the teachers’ evaluations, they may still be basing
their decision on an unreliable assessment of the student’s performance in school.
In section 3.5.1, we provide evidence of non-strategic jury behavior. Specifically,
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we show the smoothness of baseline characteristics at the passing threshold. Further,
in section 3.5.6, we also show that excluding the small part of the sample whose scores
could have been manipulated does not change the main results.
3.2.3 The higher education system
There are many academic routes that a student can take upon graduating from
secondary school. In general, students can apply to universities, higher vocational
institutes or the “Grandes Ecoles” – the most prestigious and selective institutions in
France. Back in 2002, there was no national centralized system that students could
use to apply to higher education establishments.3 Further, students applied to an
institution and major simultaneously.
The majority of universities in France are public and offer a variety of different
majors. Time to completion for most degrees is three years.4
By law, the only requirement for admission is holding the Baccalaureate degree.
However, in practice, universities are capacity constrained and a student can be
denied admission to the university and major of his choice. Priority is usually given
to students who reside in the same area as the university. Other students are admitted
on a “first come, first serve basis”. Although public universities are not normally
selective, in a recent report, the National Union of Students in France (L’Union
Nationale des Etudiants de France (UNEF)) found that some universities have been
using the results of the Baccalaureate exam as a screening device to select more
successful applicants.
3Although no national centralized system was in place, students from the Iˆle-de-France region
applied to higher education establishments via a centralized system called RAVEL.
4Students received an intermediate degree, the “Diploˆme d’e´tudes universitaires ge´ne´rales” (or
DEUG), after two years in universities. The “Licence” (or the equivalent of the Bachelor’s degree)
was awarded after an extra year. Starting 2003, the DEUG was gradually phased out. However,
only 13 universities had partially eliminated the degree by 2003. We are not too concerned about
the effects of this reform on our sample as more than 90% of the students who failed the first round
of the 2002 exams had obtained their Baccalaureate degree by 2003.
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Students need to have proof of Baccalaureate receipt in order to enroll in uni-
versities. They can apply for admission well after the results of the first and second
rounds of the General Baccalaureate are announced. More specifically, for the aca-
demic year 2001-2002, the first round exams took place from June 13 to June 20.
Students received the results of the first round on July 5. The second round oral
exams were administered from July 8 to July 11. The final results were announced
on July 11. Admissions to universities are usually open until the beginning of the
academic year in September.
The “Grandes Ecoles” are the most prestigious and selective post-baccalaureate
institutions in France. They offer degrees in a multitude of fields including engineer-
ing, business and political sciences. Time to completion for these degrees is usually
five years. Students can enroll in the “Grandes Ecoles” either immediately after
secondary school or after attending two years of preparatory classes in lyceums. Ad-
mission to both these routes is based on the students’ academic results in the last
two years of secondary education, their scores on the French literature portion of
the baccalaureate exams and tests that are specific to each institution. Admissions
decisions are made before students sit for the first round of baccalaureate exams.
Admissions to vocational and professional institutes are considered competitive.
Most degrees require three years to complete. Students are in general admitted
based on their academic results in the last two years of secondary education or upon
obtaining a distinction on the baccalaureate exams.
3.3 Data
Our data links individual-level information on secondary and post-secondary ed-
ucation to labor market outcomes and are taken from three surveys, the “Panel
d’e´le`ves du second degre´, recrutement 1995”, administered by the French statistical
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office (INSEE).5 The data contains student demographics, detailed scores on the bac-
calaureate exams taken from administrative records, post-secondary field of study,
institution attended and graduated, earnings information and employment status.
Data on post-secondary education are available on a semiannual basis for up to 9
years after receiving the General Baccalaureate degree. Labor market outcomes are
reported yearly from 2005 to 2012, up to 10 years after the General Baccalaureate
exams. Thus, one advantage of our dataset is that we are able to observe detailed
long-term outcomes. A potential drawback of the data is that it does not include
outcomes for individuals working abroad. Also, some individuals do not report their
earnings or drop out of the sample because they could not be followed by the in-
terviewers. This could potentially cause problems insofar as it is correlated with
treatment. We address these issues in section 3.5.1 by showing that there is no dis-
continuity in the probability of being observed in the labor market portion of the
survey.
The initial sample consists of 17,830 students who were enrolled in grade 6 (6e`me)
in the academic year 1995-1996. We restrict our data to students who sat for the
first round of the General Baccalaureate exam in the academic year 2001-2002.6
We do not use the results from the second round because retaking the exam can
induce differences between students who are marginally below and above the thresh-
5Data Source: Enqueˆte sur l’entre´e dans la vie adulte des e´le`ves entre´s en 6e`me en 1995 (EVA)
- 2005- 2011 - (2011) [fichier e´lectronique], INSEE [producteur], Centre Maurice Halbwachs(CMH)
[diffuseur].
6It is worth noting that grade repetition is very common in France, especially in early elementary
school years. Given that we use the 2002 first round of exams, then by definition our final sample
only includes students who did not repeat a grade between grade 6 and their last year of secondary
school. If many students in our initial sample repeated an academic year between these two grades,
this may put into question the external validity of our results. Fortunately, in our data, less than
5 percent of students sat for the General Baccalaureate exam for the first time after 2002. This
is consistent with the fact that the majority of grade repetition in France takes place in early
elementary grades. Further, students who follow the traditional route of education are less prone
to grade repetition.
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old (Martorell and McFarlin Jr., 2011). Further, the second round exams can be
strategically manipulated as they are conducted orally and administered by only one
teacher. We also exclude students who attended vocational secondary schooling as
their post Baccalaureate academic options are limited.
The main labor market outcome of interest is the natural log of average monthly
net earnings, stacked for the years 2011 and 2012. This results in up to two obser-
vations for each individual. Since earnings of individuals in their early twenties are
not usually considered a good predictor of future income, we use earnings reported
approximately 9 to 10 years after taking the baccalaureate exam, when the students
are aged between 27 and 29.
In our analysis of the quality of post-Baccalaureate institutions, the main measure
used is the average Baccalaureate score of all students in our sample attending a
certain institution, i.e average peer performance.7 Thus, we consider a university
to be of “better quality” if it has higher performing peers. Concerning field of
study, the main outcome of interest is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the
student is enrolled in a STEM designated degree or an advanced business degree.
Advanced business degrees are classified as STEM because they usually require good
quantitative skills. A complete account of the majors we designate as STEM versus
non-STEM can be found in Appendix Table B1.
Finally, we use father’s occupation as a proxy for students’ socioeconomic status.
The occupation of the father is stratified into 42 different positions that are repre-
sented by two digit identifiers. The first digit of each identifier represents one of four
main skill levels. These skill levels are the official French socioeconomic classifica-
tion as represented by the “Nonmenclature des professions et categories socioprofes-
7Stratifying institutions by tier is not as straightforward in France as it would be in the U.S.
Further, data on out of sample average Baccalaureate score by institution is not available.
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sionelles” (PCS) and are used as a reference in all official collective agreements. Our
definition of high skilled workers includes the first two skills levels, while low skilled
workers are represented by the last two.
Descriptive statistics for students who sat for the first round of the 2002 General
Baccalaureate are reported in Table B2. 38 percent of the students are male and 57
percent are from a high socioeconomic background.8 The average score on the Bac-
calaureate exam is 11.17 points, with approximately 75 percent of students passing
from the first round. Further, 98 percent of the students in our sample eventually
graduate high school (i.e. eventually pass the Baccalaureate). Respondents have
an average of 3.2 years of postsecondary education and 28 percent of students are
enrolled in a STEM major in their first year of postsecondary education. As for labor
market outcomes, the average monthly net earnings for individuals in the sample are
1,625 and 1,725 Euros for 2011 and 2012 respectively, with an employment rate of
93 percent for both years.
3.4 Identification strategy
We use a standard regression discontinuity framework (Lee and Lemieux, 2010;
Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) to estimate the effects of passing the Baccalaureate exam
from the first try on educational attainment, quality of education and future labor
market outcomes. The key identifying assumption underlying an RD design is that
all determinants of future outcomes vary smoothly across the threshold. In that
sense, any observed discontinuity at the threshold can be attributed to the causal
effect of scoring above a 10 on the Baccalaureate exam, i.e. passing on the first
851.61 percent of the students in our initial sample are male. This number is reduced to 38
percent after excluding students who were in vocational secondary schooling. However, this does
not pose any threat to identification, as we observe no discontinuity in the likelihood of being of a
certain sex at the threshold (See Section 5.1).
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attempt.
Formally, we estimate the following reduced form equation:
Yi = α + g(Si) + τDi + δXi + i
where the dependent variable Y is the outcome of interest, representing earnings and
educational outcomes for individual i. D is a dummy variable indicating whether
a person passed or failed the French Baccalaureate exam on the first try. S is the
running variable and represents an individual’s score on the first attempt of the
exam. It is defined as grade points relative to the threshold passing grade of 10. The
function g(.) captures the underlying relationship between the running variable and
the dependent variable. We allow the slopes of our fitted lines to differ on either side
of the passing threshold by interacting g(.) with treatment D in order to control for
differential trends in grades. X is a vector of controls that should improve precision
by reducing residual variation in the outcome variable, but should not significantly
alter the treatment estimates. The term  represents the error term. The parameter
of interest is τ which gives us the local average treatment effect for each regression.
In all regressions, we use population survey weights to estimate treatment effects
for the various outcomes of interest.9 Further, heteroskedastic adjusted errors are
used in all regressions.10 There are two ways to estimate the parameter τ in an
RD design. First, one can impose a specific parametric function for g(.), using all
the available grade data, to estimate the above equation via ordinary least squares
—typically referred to as the global polynomial approach. Alternatively, one can
specify g(.) to be a linear function of S and estimate the equation over a narrower
range of data, using a local linear regression. In this paper, the preferred specifica-
9Results remain unchanged when using un-weighted regressions.
10Our running variable is fairly continuous as it is reported to the nearest one hundredth of a dec-
imal point (i.e 9.91, 9.92, etc...). Accordingly, we are not too concerned about random specification
error resulting from a discrete running variable as reported in Lee and Card (2008).
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tions are drawn from local linear regressions within 1.5 grade points on either side of
the cutoff using uniform kernel weights. This avoids the problem of identifying local
effects using variation too far away from the passing threshold. Our choice of band-
width is motivated by graphical fit, data driven optimal bandwidth selectors and
the existence of other cutoff grades. Specifically, we use a robust data driven pro-
cedure, outlined in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), to predict the optimal
bandwidths (Henceforth CCT).11 This bandwidth selector improves upon previous
selectors that yield large bandwidths. Specifically, it accounts for bias-correction
stemming from large initial bandwidth choice, while also correcting for the poor
finite sample performance attributed to this bias correction. While our preferred
specifications are drawn from local linear regressions, we still present results for a
variety of bandwidths and functional forms, as has become standard in the RD liter-
ature (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The results are robust to these varying specifications
leading us to conclude that passing the Baccalaureate exam from the first attempt
results in significant differences in quality of schooling and subsequent labor market
outcomes.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Tests of the validity of the design
A standard concern with any RD design is the ability for individuals to precisely
control the assignment variable. In our context, this can occur if students and/or
graders manipulate scores in such a way that the distribution of unobservable deter-
minants of education and earnings are discontinuous at the cutoff. The first concern
is if students themselves are able to precisely sort to either side of the cutoff, espe-
cially given that the cutoff score is known beforehand. However, the Baccalaureate
11The optimal local linear bandwidth for most of our specifications ranges from 1.2 to 1.5 score
points.
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exam comprises all subject matter taken during the year, most of which is in essay
format, making it highly unlikely for any student to be able to precisely control their
grade. A potentially more worrying concern is whether graders are sorting students
to either side of the passing threshold in a non random way. Indeed, if borderline
students with better future prospects are marginally passed at a higher rate than
those with worse prospects, then our education and earnings estimates would most
likely be upward biased.
In addressing these concerns, we consider a few tests that have become standard
in the RD literature. The first informative test would be to check for any discon-
tinuity in the density of grades at the cutoff point (McCrary, 2008). The rationale
behind this test is that if individuals are manipulating grades around the cutoff,
then the grade distribution will be discontinuously uneven for grades just below and
above the cutoff. However, a running variable with a continuous density is neither
necessary nor sufficient for identification. Specifically, this test may not be as help-
ful if discontinuities in the grade distribution can be attributed to other exogenous
factors such as grade rounding.12 As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, after the initial
grading of the exams, jury members decide whether they should award extra points
to individuals just short of an important cutoff. The empirical distribution in Panel
A of Figure B1 is consistent with this idea. At each representative grade cutoff, we
observe a dip in the number of students who are just short of said cutoff combined
with a spike in the number of students who are just above it.13 This heaping is
consistent with a priori expectations that jury members are bunching grades at im-
portant cutoffs. These distributional discontinuities could be the result of strategic
cutoff crossing, or an alternative random sorting process. While, the first case is
12See Zimmerman (2014) for such a case.
13Recall, that the cutoff grades of 8 ,10 ,12 ,14 and 16 all serve a specific purpose in terms of
awarded degree.
44
obviously problematic, the latter poses no threat to identification. As highlighted in
McCrary (2008):“If teachers select at random which students receive bonus points,
then an ATE would still be identified.” In what follows, we provide evidence against
strategic cutoff crossing.
In the presence of a running variable that is discontinuously distributed for ex-
ogenous reasons, an informative visual test for grade manipulation is to verify the
smoothness of baseline characteristics. This test has become standard in the RD
literature as an alternative and often preferred approach for testing the validity of
the RD design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The intuition here is that if we observe
discontinuities in exogenous variables, then the treatment is not randomly assigned
and an average treatment effect is not identified. Further, as part of this exercise,
we also check for the presence of a discontinuity in the probability of being observed
in the follow-up labor force segment of the survey. Specifically, if probability of sur-
vey response is correlated with treatment, then the standard interpretation of our
treatment effect would be problematic.
All panels in Figure B2 present estimates of the effects of threshold crossing on
baseline characteristics. These figures take the same form as those after them in that
open circles represent local averages over a 0.25 score range. All figures represent
local linear regressions within 1.5 score points of the cutoff. Further, estimates are
computed using population weights with robust standard errors reported in paren-
theses.
We first check for the presence of a discontinuity in the averaged score of the
oral and written French literature portion of the Baccalaureate exam. There are two
advantages to looking at this variable. First, these exams are administered in grade
11, one year before all other Baccalaureate tests. In that sense, it is a very recent
indicator of student ability. Second, jury members cannot award extra points on this
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particular component of the Baccalaureate exam. Panel A of Figure B2 reveals an
insignificant treatment effect (0.0196) on the average score of the French literature
exam. We further test for a discontinuity in the Brevet national exam test scores.
This high stakes exam is taken in grade 9 and is required for entry into high school,
with the grading scale also being from 0-20. We have the averaged score for the three
major components of the Brevet exam (Mathematics, French and foreign language).
We also look at another national exam taken at the beginning of grade 6. The goal
of this exam is to evaluate the level of students in mathematics and its grading scale
is from 0 to 78. In Panel B of Figure B2, we find an insignificant treatment estimate
(0.158) on Brevet scores. Panel C of Figure B2 also reveals an insignificant treatment
effect (-0.847) on the mathematics exam scores in grade 6. This eases concerns that
jury members might be sorting students around the cutoff, based on their academic
ability.
In Panel D, we check for the presence of a discontinuity in the likelihood of being
from a high socioeconomic status (S.E.S). We also find no significant effect (0.022).
Further, in Panels E through G, we check for the smoothness of covariates that are
known to affect education and wages, but that should be independent of treatment.
Estimates on gender (0.0029), order of birth (-0.098) and number of siblings (0.138)
are all statistically insignificant. To alleviate any concerns over bandwidth and/or
functional form chosen, we present the baseline characteristics over varying functional
forms and bandwidths in Table B3. All estimates remain statistically insignificant.
Finally, we show that the predicted Baccalaureate score, as a function of the above
covariates, is continuous at the cutoff. Both panels in Figure B3 highlight these
results using a local linear and global polynomial fit respectively.
These results reject the hypothesis of strategic threshold crossing in favor of a non
strategic sorting hypothesis. They are also consistent with the fact that students’
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identities are never disclosed to neither graders nor jury members.
As highlighted in Barreca et. al (forthcoming, 2015), heaping in the running
variable can have serious consequences if it is associated with determinants of the
outcome variables. However, this will only bias the estimates to the extent that
it creates imbalances in outcome determinants around the cutoff. Therefore, as a
complement to our balanced characteristics test, we implement additional checks to
further investigate the existence of strategic sorting. Specifically, we run ‘Donut type’
RDs that deal with the heaped data at each cutoff. Panel B of Figure B1 highlights
the new distribution of grades resulting from Donut type RD regressions, which es-
sentially involves cutting out all potentially manipulable data points. We implement
these regressions in Section 3.5.6 with the main results remaining unchanged.
Finally, if marginally failing students were more likely to leave the country in
order to have access to higher quality universities or if they endogenously chose not
to respond to the follow up survey as a result of failing, then the interpretation of
our results would be problematic. As an important RD validity check, we show that
there is no significant threshold crossing effect on the likelihood of being observed
in the follow-up wage survey. These results are reported in Panel H of Figure B2
and Table B3. The absence of any differential selection into the earnings sample
alleviates any concerns attributed to leaving the sample due to barely failing the
French Baccalaureate exam.
3.5.2 Is the baccalaureate cutoff rule binding in practice?
In this paper, we estimate the impact of passing the French Baccalaureate from
the first try on future educational and labor market outcomes. Before proceeding
with the results, we first show that there is a discontinuity in the first round pass rate
at the threshold. Figure B4 is a graphical representation of the ‘first stage’, i.e. the
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probability of being awarded the Baccalaureate degree on the first round conditional
on first round exam scores. The figure shows a clear discontinuity at the cutoff, with
a sharp 100 percentage point jump in the probability of passing at the threshold.
This indicates that the Baccalaureate cutoff rule was fully binding in practice and
subsequently rules out any non-compliance issues.
3.5.3 Impact on quantity of education
In this section, we investigate whether marginally passing the Baccalaureate exam
on the first round affects the quantity of education pursued.
We first check whether barely passing from the first attempt affects the likelihood
of ever graduating from secondary school. In Panel A of Figure B5, we plot the prob-
ability of ever passing the French Baccalaureate exam as a function of the first exam
score.14 Panel A shows an insignificant treatment effect (0.003) on the probability
of ever graduating from secondary school. Estimates for varying bandwidths and
functional forms are reported in Panel A of Table B4, with the results remaining
statistically insignificant.
Next, we look at whether there is a treatment effect on the likelihood of receiving
a post-baccalaureate degree. Panel B of Figure B5 shows no significant effect of
threshold crossing on the probability of having a post-baccalaureate degree. The re-
sults remain insignificant over varying bandwidths and functional forms as is evident
from Panel B of Table B4.
We then look at whether threshold crossing leads to variation in the number of
years of postsecondary education pursued. In Panel C of Figure B5, we plot the
years of post baccalaureate education as a function of the first round exam scores.
We also find no significant treatment effect. Corresponding regression estimates are
14Global polynomial figures for all “Quantity of education” variables can be found in Appendix
Figure B6.
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reported in Panel C of Table B4. The estimates are consistent with the figure and
rule out any significant effects.
Finally, we investigate whether threshold crossing affects the age of post-secondary
graduation. In Panel D of Figure B5, we plot the age at graduation as a function
of first round exam scores. We find a significant treatment effect (0.39 years) when
using a local linear regression over a bandwidth of 1.5 points. However, as shown
in Panel D of Table B4, this estimate is not robust to different bandwidths and
functional forms.
All results remain unchanged when we add controls. These controls include exam
specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings, birth order, socioeco-
nomic status, scores on the Brevet examination, scores on the French portion of the
Baccalaureate taken in grade 11 and scores in the grade 6 national assessment exam
in Mathematics.
In summary, we rule out that passing the General Baccalaureate on the first
attempt affects the quantity of education pursued.
3.5.4 Impact on quality of education
In this section, we explore whether passing the Baccalaureate exam on the first
attempt affects quality of postsecondary education pursued. Specifically, we look at
the impact of threshold crossing on the quality of institution attended, proxied by
peer quality, and the likelihood of enrolling in a STEM major.
We rely on in-sample institution average Baccalaureate score, i.e peer perfor-
mance, as a proxy for institution quality.15 In Panel A of Figure B7, we plot the
mean student Baccalaureate score for each university as a function of first round
15A potential drawback to this approach is that the relatively small number of observations
within each institution could lead to inference problems. Specifically, all individuals within the
same institution share a common measurement error component. We correct for this by clustering
at the institution level thus allowing for a grouped error structure.
49
exam scores. As in previous figures, open circles represent local averages over a 0.25
score range. All figures represent a population weighted local linear regression using
data within 1.5 points on either side of the threshold, which has again been chosen
by the CCT bandwidth selector.16
We find a significant threshold crossing effect to the order of 0.26 Baccalaure-
ate points. This indicates that the average peer quality that students experience
increases significantly and discontinuously—to the order of 0.11 of a standard devi-
ation in Baccalaureate scores—as a result of passing from the first attempt. To put
things into perspective, this would be comparable to attending a US college whose
student body averaged 1024 SAT points off of a base college whose students averaged
1000 SAT points.17 Since our study deals with marginal public universities on either
side of the threshold, as opposed to elite versus non-elite type universities, the order
of magnitude seems reasonable and economically significant. For example, Hoekstra
(2009) finds that attending the most selective in-state university, whose peers aver-
age 65 SAT points higher than the next university, results in a 20 percent earnings
premium for males.
Panel A of Table B5 depicts discontinuity estimates using different bandwidths
and functional forms. The estimates range from 0.21 to 0.29 Baccalaureate points,
equivalent to 0.09 to 0.13 of a S.D. in test scores, and are all statistically significant
at the 5% level. Additionally, the inclusion of controls does not significantly change
16The negative slope on the left hand side of the cutoff is consistent with a first come, first served
admissions mechanism (See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.6.3 for details). Specifically, students scoring just
shy of a cutoff are more likely to pass on the second round than those farther to the left of the cutoff,
who are more likely to pass on the first round of the following year. The unintended consequence of
this is that students farther to the left of the cutoff have a better pick of universities the following
year. However, we must also note that the negative slope is not statistically significant. In Appendix
Figure B8, we also present global polynomial figures that reveal the entire fit.
17We arrive at this comparison in the following way: The average institution Baccalaureate score
just to the left of the cutoff is 10.82 points. In our dsata, this corresponds to ranking in the 45th
percentile of all students. We then compare this number to the 45th percentile score of SAT National
Percentile Ranks, which is equivalent to 1000 (We use the Verbal + Mathematics percentile rank).
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the estimates, which is consistent with the identifying assumption.
Students in France simultaneously enroll in a postsecondary institution and field
of study. Consequently, we check whether there is a discontinuity in the likelihood
of being enrolled in a STEM versus non-STEM major. Panel B of Figure B7 plots
the probability of being enrolled in a STEM major as a function of first exam score.
Threshold crossing induces a 15.9 percentage point increase in the probability of
being in a STEM major. Panel B of Table B5 reports the discontinuity estimates
using different bandwidths and functional forms and with the inclusion of controls.
All estimates remain statistically significant at the 5% level.
The data allows us to observe whether an individual graduates from a certain
institution rather than just being admitted to an institution. This is potentially
important as completion rates are sometimes low and vary across institutions, which
would in turn complicate the interpretation of the results. Consequently, we present
local linear estimates on the quality of institutions that students graduate from as
well as the likelihood of graduating with a STEM-designated major in Appendix
Figure B9. All figures show a clear discontinuity at the threshold, similar to the
initial attendance figures. This lead us to conclude that any potential labor market
effects should be the result of both attending and graduating with higher quality
schooling.
3.5.5 Impact on labor market outcomes
We now turn to whether the documented variation in quality of education is
associated with positive labor market returns. Figure B10 graphically depicts the
relationship between labor market outcomes and the distance from the first round
exam cutoff. All panels report estimates from local linear regressions using a band-
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width of 1.5 points, with standard errors clustered at the individual level.18 We first
check whether threshold crossing generates any significant changes in the likelihood
of employment. In Panel A of Figure 7, we find an insignificant -0.008 percentage
point change in the likelihood of employment at the threshold. As shown in Panel
A of Table 5, all regression estimates remain statistically insignificant over varying
bandwidths and functional forms. Further, the addition of controls does not signifi-
cantly affect estimates.
We then explore whether threshold crossing affects earnings. Specifically, we focus
on the average monthly net earnings for the years 2011 and 2012. The earnings
from both years are stacked, resulting in up to two observations per individual.
Accordingly, standard errors are clustered at the individual level. We look at net
monthly earnings as a function of exam score in Panel B of Figure B10. We find that
first round passing is associated with a 252 Euro monthly premium. Additionally, in
Panel C, we look at logged monthly earnings. We find that threshold crossing leads
to a 12.8 log point (13.6 percent) increase in earnings. Corresponding regression
estimates are shown in Panels B and C of Table B6. These estimates are robust to
different bandwidths and functional forms. For instance, the estimates for logged
earnings vary from 12.6 to 18 log points and are all statistically significant at the
1% level. Further, the addition of controls does not significantly alter the estimates
for earnings, which is consistent with the identifying assumption. We conclude that
while passing the Baccalaureate exam on the first try does not affect the likelihood
of employment, it does significantly alter future earnings at the intensive margin.
18Global polynomial figures for all “Labor market” variables can be found in Appendix Figure
B11.
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3.5.6 Robustness checks
Before interpreting our results, we run additional robustness checks. Primarily,
we address concerns that heaping in the running variable could lead to bias—even in
the presence of balanced covariates. To alleviate such concerns, we run ‘Donut type’
RD regressions that involve dropping all potentially manipulable data points around
the threshold (See Dahl et. al, 2014 and Zimmerman, 2014 for similar applications
of Donut RDs). In our setting, scoring within 0.25 points to the left of a cutoff
generally allows for a student’s grade to be reconsidered. Further, grades are pushed
to anywhere between X to X.1 points, with X representing a respective cutoff. As
a result, we drop all individuals whose first exam grade lies anywhere between 7.75-
8.1, 9.75-10.1, 11.75-12.1, 13.75-14.1 and 15.75-16.1 points. The new distribution
of grades is highlighted in Panel B of Figure A1. Regression estimates from these
‘Donut’ type RD specifications can be found in Tables B7, B8 and B9, where we
report modified treatment estimates for quantity of education, quality of education
and labor market outcomes respectively. We report all outcome variables over the
same bandwidths and functional forms previously analyzed. Precision is reduced in
most specifications, which is to be expected given the reduced data. However, all
previously significant treatment effects remain so. Further, point estimates slightly
increase for most specifications, which is at odds with a strategic sorting story. If
jury members were endogenously sorting students, then we would expect our new
point estimates to be significantly reduced.
Generally, jury members give special attention to grades that are within 0.25
points short of a cutoff. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of certain
jury members awarding extra points for scores that are even further away from the
threshold. To further investigate this issue, we take a closer look at the distribution
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of Baccalaureate test scores within a 9 to 11 grade window in Figure B12. Noticeably,
the distribution of test scores drops sharply and linearly in the range of 9.65 to 9.99
Baccalaureate points. This sudden drop in the distribution is consistent with the
potential for manipulation of test scores as reported in Dee et. al (2011). As a result,
we further exclude from our ‘Donut RD’ analysis all individuals scoring between 9.65
and 9.75 points which effectively takes care of all test scores that could potentially
be manipulated. We then reestimate all treatment effects. These results are also
reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8. Precision is further reduced in most specifications.
Nonetheless, all previously significant effects remain so. Altogether, the results from
both Donut RD specifications reject a strategic sorting hypothesis and are in line
with our main results and conclusions.
Finally, we check for earnings discontinuities at pseudo cutoff scores around the
passing threshold score. To do so, we gradually estimate treatment effects for 50 fake
cutoff scores on either side of the original passing threshold. We use logged monthly
earnings as the outcome variable in this placebo test. Results indicate that the cutoff
score of 10 provides for the largest and most significant discontinuity. Figure B13
of the appendix summarizes these findings by graphing t-statistics for these various
placebo cutoff scores. The estimated t-statistic at the zero cutoff score represents
the original one, with all others being placebo statistics for fake cutoff treatments
relative to the original.19 All significant estimates are highlighted in the graph with
a large red filled circle. We observe only 2 significant treatment effects out of a
possible 100. We conclude that no other important cutoff value (8 ,12, 14, 16) has
a significant effect on earnings except for the original high stakes passing cutoff of
10. These results also provide further evidence on the importance of passing the
19Each open circle represents the t-statistic from a local linear regression of bandwidth = 1.5
Baccalaureate points.
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Baccalaureate exam from the first round and the significant earnings premium that
this induced variation leads to.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Interpreting the documented labor market premium
We interpret our results as “intent to treat” effects whereby increased access
to higher quality schooling results in a 13.6 percent earnings premium for the low
skilled student. Indeed, our “first stage” results show that a significant proportion
of students who pass from the first round attend a university with higher performing
peers and/or are more likely to pursue a STEM major. This allows us to measure
the effect of increased access to higher quality education on later lifetime outcomes,
but not the effect of any specific change in higher education quality.
Our interpretation hinges on the fact that only quality of education dimensions
vary at the cutoff. As a result, we rule out other potential channels through which
marginally passing the Baccalaureate exam on the first round could affect earnings.
First, we show that there is no impact on the likelihood of ever being awarded the
Baccalaureate degree. This is not surprising as students are required to hold the
degree if they wish to enroll in postsecondary education. Furthermore, students
who want to enter the labor force immediately after secondary school could use the
baccalaureate degree as a signal of their ability to potential employers. Therefore,
students are incentivized to retake the exam until they are awarded the degree. This
is in line with recent evidence which finds that exit exams don’t cause increased
high school dropout rates (Clark and See, 2011). Second, we find that threshold-
crossing has no impact on the likelihood of obtaining a post-baccalaureate degree nor
on the years of postsecondary education. These results are expected given the vast
number of non selective universities and majors in France whose only requirement
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for admission is holding the Baccalaureate degree.
Another factor that can affect the interpretation of our estimates is that the
documented increase in earnings could be driven by employers who use passing on
the first round as a signal of productivity. To alleviate such concerns, we focus on
a segment of the population who have chosen not to attend college.20 If employers
are using the first round of the Baccalaureate exam as a signal of productivity,
then we would expect the signal to be most pronounced for this segment of the
population. Appendix Figure B14 shows that there is no threshold crossing effect
on earnings for this subpopulation. While the estimate is not precise due to small
sample issues, it is still comforting to see that there is no discernible discontinuity
at the cutoff.21 Furthermore, it is unlikely that employers are able to distinguish
students who marginally passed and marginally failed the first round exams.
A final concern is that age of Baccalaureate or post Baccalaureate graduation
is lower for marginal passers. In this case, at least part of the observed earnings
premium might be explained by work experience. While we cannot reject the ex-
istence of a threshold crossing effect on age of post baccalaureate graduation, the
results indicate that marginally passing from the first attempt potentially increases
the age at graduation. This would cause us to understate the earnings estimate, in
so far as work experience is positively correlated with earnings. The results are not
surprising given that some STEM majors require more time to complete in France.
For example, engineering degrees are awarded after five years in higher education,
as opposed to three years for most other degrees. Finally, for age at Baccalaureate
receipt, Appendix Figure B15 reveals no significant treatment effect.
20We have previously shown that there is no discontinuity in college attendance which is why we
are not too wary about conditioning on non-college attendance.
21We use a quadratic polynomial regression because there is insufficient data to run meaningful
local linear regressions.
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3.6.2 Returns to STEM education?
Although it would be interesting to examine the effects for different subgroups of
students, our sample size does not allow us to run a thorough heterogeneity analysis.
We do however investigate the impacts for students from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds, with the caveat of reduced precision. This allows us to present sugges-
tive evidence on the earnings premium of pursuing a STEM degree, holding quality of
university constant. To do so, we look at a subpopulation of students whose quality
of schooling is likely to differ in only one dimension. Specifically, students from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds may be less likely to attend higher quality institutions.
In fact, there is clear evidence that low-income students tend to “undermatch” and
not attend the highest quality colleges available to them (Smith et al., 2013). This
seems highly plausible in our context as the default choice of education in France is
to attend the public university that is closest to the area of residence. These univer-
sities are not always of the highest quality and are a less expensive option for lower
earning families, in terms of housing and transportation. Further, the possibility of
pursuing a STEM degree at a lower quality university is higher than it would be at
a better quality one. The results from Table 9 are consistent with this idea.
Our preferred specification in column 3 suggests that students from low socioe-
conomic backgrounds are not attending better universities. However, they are 26.4
percentage point more likely to pursue a STEM degree.22 We also estimate an 11.4
percent earnings premium for this subgroup of students. If we were to believe that no
other changes were happening at the threshold, then rescaling the reduced form wage
estimate by the documented increase in the likelihood of pursuing a STEM major
suggests a 43 percent return to pursuing a STEM designated major for students of
22We do not provide any figures for these results as the smaller samples leads to the under-
smoothing of mean plots.
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low socioeconomic backgrounds.23
3.6.3 Quality of education mechanisms
In this paper, we find that marginally passing the French Baccalaureate exam on
the first attempt leads to an increase in quality of post secondary education as well
as future earnings. We present three possible explanations for the observed increase
in schooling quality.
First, students who sat for the second round of exams could have been at a dis-
advantage because universities admitted students on a “first come, first serve” basis.
The results of the second round of exams were announced a week after the results
of the first round. While this might seem like a short period of time, this extra
week could still be an important advantage for those who wish to enroll in the uni-
versity/major combinations that are in high demand. For instance, our education
survey asks students whether they are content with the field they are pursuing and
the reason they didn’t enroll in the major of their choice. Amongst those who failed
the first round, 11.88% said that they were too late in enrolling in their first choice
of major. This number is only 4.88% for students who passed the first round exams.
Second, the documented impact of threshold crossing on higher education qual-
ity could be due to a discouragement effect. Marginally failing students may be
discouraged by their results, making them more susceptible to impulsive educational
decisions such as enrolling in lower quality universities or non-STEM majors. This
discouragement effect has been previously documented in the literature by looking
at whether exit exams induce increased high school dropout rates, with the results
being mixed (Martorell, 2004; Reardon et al., 2010; Ou, 2010; Papay et. al, 2010;
23It should be noted that this is only suggestive evidence as the threshold crossing effect on
quality of university is not very precise.
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Clark and See, 2011).
Third, universities could perceive the timing of degree receipt as a signal of stu-
dent ability which would then factor into admissions decisions. This is reinforced
by the fact that the second round of exams have lower standards for passing and
are often deemed unreliable (see Buchaillat et al., 2011). Most public universities
in France are not selective but they are capacity constrained. Back in 2002, they
were required to give priority in their admissions to students residing in the same
area. Other students usually enrolled on a “first come, first serve” basis. However,
in a recent report, the National Union of Students in France (L’Union Nationale des
Etudiants de France) found that some universities were using the results from the
Baccalaureate exam to select students into majors that are in high demand. Thus,
we cannot rule out selection by universities as a channel through which marginally
failing the first round affects the quality of higher education.
3.6.4 Earnings mechanisms
The two classical channels through which quality of higher education can affect
earnings are human capital formation and signaling. Our measure of university qual-
ity is the average performance of peers in secondary school. Better peers can affect
future earnings through both signaling (i.e. better peers attend better institutions)
and human capital accumulation. One test of the signaling channel would be to look
at whether the earnings effect decreases with age (Hoekstra, 2009). Our data only
allows us to observe detailed labor market outcomes between the ages of 27 to 29.24
Thus, we are unable to perform this test.
Another possible explanation for the earnings effect, that would favor the human
capital channel, is that students who are marginally above the cutoff attend univer-
24Even though we observe labor market outcomes for years prior to this, detailed earnings data
is only available for the last two years of the survey.
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sity/major combinations that have more resources. Most universities in France are
public and receive most of their funding from the government. Nonetheless, spending
per student is different across institutions. For example, universities spent, on aver-
age, 6,500 euros per student in 2000. This number is 8,600 euros in higher technical
institutes. Students in engineering schools and preparatory classes for the “Grandes
Ecoles” benefited from 11,500 and 12,600 euros respectively. While students around
the cutoff do not usually attend preparatory classes for the “Grandes Ecoles”, there is
still some heterogeneity in spending across different university/major combinations.
Unfortunately, detailed data on spending per university is not available for the period
of our study.25 Therefore, we are unable to test whether higher quality universities
and majors affect earnings through providing students with better resources.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter estimates the labor market gains to higher quality postsecondary
education for low skilled students. We use a regression discontinuity design that com-
pares individuals who marginally pass and fail the French Baccalaureate exam on
the first attempt. Specifically, we find that marginally passing increases enrollment
in a university with better performing peers, to the order of 0.11 of a standard devi-
ation in Baccalaureate test scores. It also leads to a 15.9 percentage point increase
in the likelihood of pursuing a STEM degree. Further, we also find that threshold
crossing leads to a 13.6 percent increase in earnings with no significant effects on em-
ployment. We find no impact on the likelihood of graduating from secondary school
or college nor on years of postsecondary education. Accordingly, we interpret our
results as intent to treat effects whereby increased access to higher quality postsec-
25This data was made available starting 2009. However, the algorithm used to allocate resources
to universities also changed. As a result, it would misleading to use recent data on spending per
university.
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ondary education results in a 13.6 percent earnings premium for 27 to 29 year olds
in France.
Our results have significant policy implications. First, while it remains an open
question as to the extent to which our results apply to other settings, they suggest
that academically marginal students benefit from higher quality postsecondary ed-
ucation in a significant way. From a policy perspective, this indicates that there
are potential gains from increasing lower skilled students’ access to higher quality
institutions and STEM majors. Second, while we find that students who marginally
fail the Baccalaureate are not discouraged from entering higher education or grad-
uating college, our results suggest that there exist substantial costs associated with
exit exams that have not yet been considered. Exit exams may restrict access to
higher quality postsecondary education which in turn can have a significant impact
on earnings. These costs should be considered in the current debate over the use of
exit exams in the United States.
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4. BETTER OR BEST? HIGH SCHOOL QUALITY AND ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE
4.1 Introduction
Parents willingly invest large amounts of resources in order to get their children
into the best school possible. As a result, understanding the benefits to attending
high achievement schools is of critical importance in the economics of education lit-
erature. Further, ability tracking into high schools is becoming increasingly popular.
Notably, while many European and Asian countries have long used ability tracking
to sort students into high schools, this phenomenon has been mostly restricted to
selective high schools in large cities in the U.S. (e.g the Bostons Latin school and
the Bronx school of science). More recently, however, the number of school districts
offering test based admission standards into magnet schools has increased.
In China, all students wishing to enter high school must sit for a national high
school entrance exam—the Zhongkao. Every year, millions of Chinese middle school
students prepare to take this high-stakes entrance exam—the sole determinant of
high school eligibility. Before sitting for this exam, students must submit an ordered
list of preferred high schools they wish to enroll in. Accordingly, China provides for
an interesting natural experiment, with far reaching policy implications, to analyze
the effects of school quality on academic performance and college outcomes. To do
so, we use a regression discontinuity design that compares the academic outcomes of
students who are barely eligible and barely ineligible to enter a high school of higher
quality. This allows us to overcome selection bias arising from the fact that choice of
high school is likely correlated with unobservable factors that may also affect future
performance, such as ability and motivation.
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The main results of this chapter are divided into two parts. The first part relies
on identification off of multiple between school cutoffs. This strategy allows us to
determine the effects of attending a “better high school” in the spirit of Pop-Eleches
& Urquiola (2013). Using this strategy, we find that relative to students who just
miss scoring above a school cutoff, individuals experience, on average, a significant
increase in the average high school entrance exam score displayed by their peers to
the order of 0.15 - 0.17 standard deviations. However, this does not translate into
better academic outcomes as measured by the high stakes college entrance exam
(Gaokao) at the end of high school.
Our second set of results relies on identification off of a single between school
cutoff. Specifically, this strategy looks at the effects of attending the “best high
schools” available to a student within a town—defined as enrolling in a tier one high
school. We find that having the opportunity to attend tier 1 high schools also re-
sults in a significant increase in peer effects in high school as measured by a 0.19
- 0.26 standard deviation increase in average peer test scores. This translates into
improved academic performance in the college entrance exam to the order of 0.06
- 0.1 standard deviations. Importantly, this also results in a significant increase in
students’ eligibility to attend a four year college but not in their eligibility to attend
an elite college. Notably, despite the fact that both males and females face a simi-
lar improvement in high school peers, the documented positive effects on academic
performance are mainly driven by males.
An emerging body of literature looks at whether quality of schooling has a signif-
icant impact on academic performance.1 However, the question of whether schools
1There is also a growing literature that has looked at the earnings effects of attending better
quality schooling at the college or high school level (See, for example: Hoekstra, 2009; Saavedra
2009; Zimmerman 2014; Clark & Del Bono, 2014; Canaan & Mouganie, 2015). These papers
conclude that higher quality schooling leads to better labor market outcomes.
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with more attractive peers are really better in a value-added sense remains open.
Using test based discontinuity designs, Jackson (2010) and Pop-Eleches & Urquiola
(2013) find that attending a more selective high school has positive effects on aca-
demic performance in Trinidad & Tobago and Romania respectively.2 On the other
hand, Clark (2010); Abdulkadirog˘lu et. al. (2014); Dobbie & Fryer (2014) and Lucas
& Mbiti (2014) find that attending high achievement high schools does not result in
improved academic performance.3
We contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we present
new RD estimates on the academic performance of students attending better quality
high schools. Notably—taking advantage of our unique setting and data—we are the
first paper to draw a distinction between going to a better high school and going to an
elite high school within the same educational setting. This appears to be important
as the reduced form effect on academic outcomes differs between both empirical
strategies, despite the variation in peer composition being statistically similar in
both. In other words, despite both sets of students, attending a better versus an
elite high school, facing similar improvements in peer composition, academic gains
are only documented in the case of attending the latter. This contrasts with recent
work in the U.S showing no returns to elite schooling (Dobbie and Fryer, 2014;
Abdulkadirog˘lu et. al, 2014).
Second, taking advantage of a unique teacher designation in China, we provide
for evidence to explain the disparity in academic outcomes from attending a better
2Ding & Lehrer (2007) use a selection on observables type design and conclude that high
school peer quality has a significant and positive outcome on college entrance test scores in China.
Berkowitz & Hoekstra (2011) compare the college outcomes of students who decided to enroll in
a highly selective high school to those who did not despite being admitted. They conclude that
attending a highly selective high school causes students to attend more selective colleges.
3Duflo et. al (2011) find scant evidence on the existence of positive peer effects on the short run
academic outcomes of primary school children in Kenya. Similarly, Zhang (2014) concludes that
attending high achievement public middle schools in China does not result in improved academic
outcomes.
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versus best high school. Teachers in China undergo rigorous, multifaceted evaluations
of their performance each year, providing us with an excellent measure of teacher
quality unavailable in most other contexts.4 Particularly, we observe a compelling
discontinuity in the ratio of superior teachers to students at the cutoff of attending
a top tier high school. This effect is not visible when focusing on students who
attend a better high school, regardless of tier. Assuming that peer effects are not
highly non-linear in student ability, this suggests that teacher quality may explain
the largest portion of our findings. These findings are in line with recent work by
Jackson (2013) who finds that peer achievement can only explain a small fraction
of the school selectivity effect on average. Further, this is also consistent with Park
& Hannum (2001) who hypothesize that most of the variation in student test scores
in China is likely due to teacher differences. They further show that teacher quality
ranks in China contain a substantial amount of information about teacher quality not
contained in traditional variables such as education and experience. This suggests
that China provides for a good setting to analyze the academic effects of teacher
quality. Importantly, our findings could also potentially help explain the mixed
results in the literature on the effects of high achievement high schools.
Third, while other studies have found academic gains for females who attend
higher quality schooling, our results indicate that in the Chinese context, these gains
are restricted to males—despite both genders facing the same improvement in school
inputs. For instance, Jackson (2010) finds that attending a better high school has
twice the academic effect on girls than for boys in Trinidad and Tobago. This suggests
that institutional setting plays a vital role when deciding policies that may expand
access to higher quality schooling.
4In this paper, we focus on the variation in number of superior/advanced teacher designations
which is given only to the best teachers in China. See Section 2 for more details.
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4.2 The education system
4.2.1 Schooling in China
Children in China generally start elementary school at the age of six or seven.
After spending six years in elementary school, children then move on to the first part
of middle school—a 3-year junior middle school (7th to 9th grade) as part of the
9-year national compulsory education system.5 Graduates from junior middle school
then choose to pursue either vocational or traditional schooling. The traditional
education path involves participating in the second part of middle school, which is
equivalent to US high schools. Three years of high school are then followed by higher
education (university/college) if one desires to continue their studies.
In China, elementary and middle school education are both free and compulsory.
On the other hand, high school education is neither compulsory nor free. However, in
most parts of China, the majority of high schools are public and charge relatively low
tuition.6 7 In the large city we study, around 40% of junior middle school graduates
go to vocational schools and 60% end up going to high school. As only high school
graduates are eligible to take the college entrance test, students compete for positions
in high school. Competition is most prominent and severe at the top ranked high
schools. This competition is in the form of a city level exam compromised of seven
subjects (Zhongkao or the HET). These subjects are Chinese language, Mathematics,
English language, Physics, Chemistry, Political Science and Physical education. The
weighted sum of these seven subjects is the one and only criterion for high school
5There are rare cases in which elementary schools are 5 years long while junior middle schools
are 4 years long. However, for students in our province, it is a 6-3 system.
6Private high schools generally account for less than 5% of high schools and are generally not
as good as public schools.
7For the sample of students in our province, it is around $200 per year and deductible if family
income satisfies certain requirements.
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admission for most students.8 The HET is graded out of a possible 790 points.9
After high school, students wanting to go to college are required to take the col-
lege entrance test (Gaokao or the CET) after three years of high school. Students
usually choose an academic concentration (Arts or Science) at the beginning of their
junior year (2nd year) in high school. Some college majors only take students from
either path and some take both, so this choice can be a combination of personal pref-
erence and comparative advantage. In theory, the choice of academic concentration
is left to the student. The provincial college level entrance exam takes two forms—
Arts or Sciences—depending on a student’s concentration in high school. Students
concentrating in arts take an exam that includes Chinese language, Mathematics
for arts students, English language and a comprehensive arts test (Political Science,
History and Geography). On the other hand, students concentrating in sciences take
an exam that includes Chinese language, Mathematics for science students, English
language and a comprehensive science test (Physics, Chemistry and Biology). The
exam for both tracks is graded out of a possible 750 points.10 Similar to the high
school admissions process, the total weighted score on this high stakes exam is the one
and only criterion for college admission. In fact, eligibility into a four years college
is determined by a threshold determined within a province. In other words, unless
a student scores above a score threshold set forth by each university (determined
at the province level), then they are not eligible to enter that university. Further,
unlike high schools, students in China are free to go to any university—regardless of
8The only exceptions are students with special talent, for example athletes. These students
represent a very small portion of the whole population.
9Chinese, Math and English are each graded out of a possible 150 points. Politics, Physics and
Chemistry are each graded from 0 to 100 points. Finally Physical education is graded out of a
possible 40 points.
10For the Science track: Chinese, Mathematics for the sciences and English are each graded
out of 150 points. The science comprehensive test is graded out of 300 points.
For the Arts track: Chinese, Mathematics for the arts and English are each graded out of 150
points. The arts comprehensive testis graded out of 300 points.
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location within China—conditional on meeting that university’s threshold score.
4.2.2 High school choice mechanism
High school admissions for the province we are looking at is centrally operated
by each city’s education administrators. In early June, students fill out application
forms indicating their ordered preference of high schools. These students then take
the high school entrance exam in mid June. High schools predetermine how many
students they wish to admit for that year and grant them admissions based on stu-
dents’ preferences and test scores. Most provinces, including ours, use an admission
procedure similar to the Boston Mechanism. In the first round of admissions, each
college only considers students who list them as their first choice. Students with
CET scores above a certain threshold are accepted and the rest are rejected and
placed in a pool of candidates for to be considered by the next university on a stu-
dent’s list. Only in the event that a university still has any remaining slots after the
first round will it consider admitting students who list them as their second or third
choice. Once a student is granted admission by any college, the selection process
ends for that student and he/she are not to be considered by any other college. For
illustration, suppose school A plans to enroll 100 students for that academic year.
Further, suppose that there are 80 students who indicate their first choice preference
is to join that school. School A will first admit those 80 students, then proceed
to rank students who listed A as their second choice—conditional on not yet being
admitted by their first choice. If there are more than 20 of those applicants, school
A will take the 20 highest scoring students. If admissions slots remain, then School
A proceeds to fill the rest of their seats with students who list A as their third choice
and so forth. In the more likely scenario that there are more than 100 students who
list School A as their first preference, officials just pick the highest scoring 100 stu-
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dents. The lowest admitted student’s score—regardless of preference order—is the
official cutoff score for school A for that year. High schools go through this process
simultaneously, as each student can be admitted by at most one school.
To ensure smoother and more transparent school-student matching, schools are
divided into four groups. We call these groups tiers as they are divided by school
quality. Tiers are determined by the city education department in advance of students
applying for admissions and this information is made publicly available to them. 11
Schools in the first tier are the first ones to start the admissions process. After
tier one schools fill all their seats, tier two schools will start admitting students, then
tier three and four. Accordingly, students list their preferences by tier. For each
tier, a student has four ordered school choices. The order of choice is important as
most competitive schools fill their slots solely with students who have them listed as
their first choice. Students generally understand this and as a result most list their
preferences by perception of school quality.12 However, in the unlikely case that a
student is not aware of the admissions system, then scoring extremely high on the
test may not always guarantee one go to a top quality school.
School choice is different for students from different parts of the city we analyze.
Specifically, the city is divided into twelve administrative districts by their geographic
location and school choice is separated by these areas as well. Of the twelve districts,
eight of them are mostly urban areas and relatively small. Students from these eight
districts can go to high schools in their own district but also have access to schools in
the other seven urban districts. Specifically, a student residing in an urban area can
choose from almost all urban tier one schools—regardless of district—in addition to
11The best schools are assigned to tier one, then the second best are tier two and so forth.
Schools may be in different tiers from one year to another to reflect quality changes but generally
the composition is quite stable.
12It is very common for teachers to assist their students in filling these applications.
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schools in tier two to four from their own district. On the other hand, students from
rural districts have a choice set of only 2 tier one schools and 11 tier two-four schools
to choose from, on average. Further, students residing in the four rural/suburban
districts can only choose high schools in their own district. As a result, tier 1 high
schools in rural areas can be thought of as magnet schools. Finally, the high school
choice mechanism in China almost guarantees that all students residing in rural
areas will list all tier-1 schools in order of rank as their first preference. For the
above reasons, we restrict our sample to students from rural/suburban districts in
our analysis.
Another interesting feature of our sample is that public high schools are allowed
to set aside around 10% of their seats as “high priced” ones. Students enrolled
through the high-priced channel pay a one-time fee to the school upon registration
even though they receive the same education as the other regular students.13 In the
admissions process these high prices seats can be though of as their own independent
school (with their own respective cutoffs). For illustration, suppose school A plans to
set 90 regular seats and 10 high-priced seats. Then A (regular) and A (high-priced)
independently go through the high school admissions process as described above.
Thus, all schools with high-priced seats, will have two cutoffs—one for regular stu-
dents and one for high priced students—and this information is released to the public
by both education officials and the media. In our analysis, we drop all individuals
who entered high school through this “high priced” process. Private schools do not
have this fee distinction as they often charge high tuition. However, private high
schools are rare and generally do not attract the best students in the city.
13This one-time fee is set by the schools and released to students before they apply. In the urban
area it is usually around 40,000 Yuan (6,600 USD) and 20,000 Yuan (3,300 USD).
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4.3 Data
We use student level administrative data on a large capital city of a densely
populated province in China. As a condition of using the data, we are unable to reveal
the name of the province and city. We restrict our data to individuals attending
traditional high school as those attending vocational schooling are not generally
eligible to take the college entrance examination. Further, we restrict our sample
to three rural/suburban districts in that city for reasons previously discussed in
section 4.2.2.14 Finally, we drop all students attending school through the “high-
price” channel. Our final sample consists of 15,367 students taking the high school
entrance exam (HET) in the year 2007 and the college entrance exam (CET) in
2010. We observe both the HET and CET scores for all individuals in our data.
We are also able to observe some basic characteristics of the students such as the
middle school and high school they attended, gender, age, etc...The original data
does not contain information on school and teacher characteristics. However, we are
able to collect school level data from government reports and official school websites.
Importantly, we are able to link this information to our original dataset through high
school identifiers.
Within the three rural areas we analyze, students generally have at most 15
high schools to choose from with the tier of each school made clear to all. The
main determinant of high school attendance is the score on the high school entrance
exam. We observe detailed administrative data on test scores by subject and the
eventual high school attended by the student. In our analysis on quality of high
school attended, we document an improvement in high school quality through peer
performance. Specifically, the peer quality within a high school is measured by the
14Technically, there are four such areas in this city but one of them does not have a single tier
one high school thus we exclude that area from our study.
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average exam score on the HET for each school.
The main outcome of interest is a student’s total score on the college entrance
exam as this high stakes exam determines a student’s eligibility for college. A po-
tential drawback of our data is that we are unable to observe the university that
students eventually attend. However, eligibility for entry into a four year college
and/or elite college is centrally determined by whether a student crosses the lowest
threshold score imposed by a specific university. This threshold is common to all
students in a province regardless of which city they reside in within the province. As
a result, we are able to document whether students from our sample are eligible for
entry into any four year college or/and an elite college simply from their final CET
exam scores. Specifically, eligibility into a four year college is defined by whether a
student scores above the lowest possible threshold score for entry into a four-year
university. Similarly, eligibility into an elite college is defined by whether a student
crosses the lowest threshold for entry into an elite university.15
Descriptive statistics for all students who sat for the 2007 HET are reported in
Table C1. These statistics are reported for the whole sample and by high school
tier. The average score on the HET and CET is 612 and 492 points with a standard
deviation of 61 and 97 points respectively. These scores increase with the level of
tier as to be expected. Females are slightly more represented in high school with
53% of high schools compromised of women. The likelihood of choosing to major in
arts after your first year in high school is 48% for the whole sample. This number is
much higher the lower you go down the tiers. A very small percentage of students
are in private high schools (1%) and 57% of high schools are designated as being
“high school only”. The alternative to this is for a school to contain both middle
15Formally, universities in China are also divided into tiers. We define an elite university as a
tier-1 university.
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and high school students. Interestingly, schools in better tiers are more likely to be
designated as “High school only”. 44% of our sample are eligible to go to a four
year college. This number is as high as 67& for students attending tier one high
schools and sharply drops to 28%, 7% and 1% for tiers two to four. Further, better
tier schools tend to be larger in size and have more overall teachers. Importantly,
the average number of superior teachers are much higher in better quality schools.
Tier 1 schools have 92 superior teachers, whereas this number drops sharply to 45
for tier 2 schools. Finally, teacher gender is equally distributed with about 53% of all
teachers in our sample being female. Tier 1 schools have a less proportion of female
teachers (49%), whereas tiers 2 to 4 high schools have around 55% female teachers.
4.4 Identification strategy
4.4.1 Identification using a single between school cutoff
As mentioned earlier, high schools in the province we are analyzing are divided
into four tiers with the first tier containing the best set of high schools within a
district or town. Accordingly, we use a regression discontinuity design (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) to estimate the causal impact of elite
high school attendance (defined as going to a tier-1 high school) on college entrance
exam scores and college outcomes. The key identifying assumption underlying an
RD design is that all determinants of future outcomes vary smoothly across the tier-1
high school admissions threshold. This is likely to hold, as precisely manipulating
the overall exam score is highly implausible. Furthermore, the admissions cutoff
for each high school is only announced after exams are administered and graded.
To support these claims, we show that there is no evidence of bunching around the
threshold, and that treatment estimates do not significantly change with the addition
of covariates. As a result, any discontinuity observed at the threshold score can be
73
attributed to the causal effect of attending an elite high school. In our analysis of
elite school attendance, we focus on three towns. Each town t = 1,2,3 contains i =
1,...N individuals and s = 1,...,S number of schools. Additionally let z represent the
tier 1 cutoff within each respective town t. Formally, consider the following “reduced
form” regression:
Yi = α + h(Si) + τDi + δXi + i, (4.1)
Where the dependent variable Y is the outcome of interest. D is a dummy variable
indicating whether a person crosses the town specific score threshold for attending
a tier 1 high school.16 S represents student high school entrance test scores in 2007
measured in points relative to the cutoff score of each town relying on the fact that
S represents the distance between each town’s cutoff and the transition score of each
student in that town. Formally, Si = gradei−gradez for all individuals within a town
facing a common cutoff z. The function h(.) captures the underlying relationship
between the running variable and the dependent variable. We also allow the slopes of
the fitted lines to differ on either side of the admissions threshold by interacting h(.)
with the treatment dummy D. X is a vector of controls that should improve precision
by reducing residual variation in the outcome variable, but should not significantly
change the treatment estimate—consistent with our identifying assumption. The
term  represents unobservable factors affecting outcomes. Finally, the parameter τ
gives us the average effect of having the opportunity to access a tier-1 high school
for each outcome of interest.
In our analysis, we specify h(.) to be a linear function of S and estimate the
equation over a narrower range of data, using local linear regressions with a uniform
16Essentially, we have 3 thresholds, each representing a different town.
74
kernel. This approach can be viewed as generating estimates that are more local to
the threshold and does not impose any strong functional assumptions on the data.
As a result, the preferred specifications in this paper are drawn from local linear
regressions with the optimal bandwidths chosen by a robust data driven procedure
as outlined in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)—Henceforth CCT. We also
present results for a variety of bandwidths relative to the optimal bandwidth as has
become standard in the RD literature (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Further, standard
errors are clustered at the high school score level, as suggested in Lee & Card (2008).
While we generally focus on reduced form results from specifications like (1), we
also present estimates from an instrumental variables type specification. This allows
us to infer the average effect of going to a tier-1 or elite high-school as opposed to
just having the opportunity to do so. Formally:
Yi = α + h(Si) + βE(Ci|Si) + γXi + i, (4.2)
E(Ci|Si) = α + h(Si) + λDi + θXi + i, (4.3)
where (4.3) is the “first stage” or the compliance ratio. It denotes the ratio of
tier-1 eligible students who actually take up this opportunity. β from equation (4.2)
gives us the local average treatment estimate (LATE) of going to a tier-1 high school
in a 2SLS framework. This is nothing more than the Wald estimate and can also be
computed by re-weighting the ITT estimate (τ) by the first stage estimate (λ).
4.4.2 Identification using multiple between school cutoffs
Within each of the three towns in our sample, we rank schools according to
their posted admissions cutoff score for that year (2007). This yields 34 quasi-
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experiments as each cutoff results in a potential RD analysis.17 Following Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola (2013), we focus on regressions that pool data across cutoffs.
Specifically, we stack the data such that each student within a certain town serves
as a separate observation for each cutoff.18 Due to repeated observations, we cluster
our standard errors at the individual level. This procedure is relevant as a student
with the best ex-poste score in a specific town does not always attend the best school
if his ex-ante school choices were conservatively chosen. Formally, our reduced form
regression from this procedure takes the following form:
Yiz = α + h(Siz) + ωDiz + φXi + i (4.4)
Here the subscript i still refers to students and the subscript z refers to all possible
high school cutoffs facing an individual within a town (i.e. z= 1,...,H-1; where H
represent the total number of high schools in that town ordered from worst to best
based on their respective cutoff scores). ω gives us the ITT estimate of having the
opportunity to go to a better school, regardless of tier. Further, the running variable
is defined as Siz = gradeiz−gradez for all individuals within a town facing numerous
cutoffs z. As a result, equation (4.4) takes the same form as equation (4.1) except for
the fact that each individual can be observed multiple times depending on his/her
relative position to a high school cutoff. However, regressions restricted to students
scoring close to the cutoffs rarely use student-level observations more than once.
17We have an average of around 12 schools for each town resulting in 11 different cutoffs within
each town.
18For instance, our smallest town has 13 different schools, leading to 12 separate cutoffs. This
town also contains 4,595 students. For that town, our procedure produces a dataset of (4,595 ×
12) 55,146 observations.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Going to a better high school
In this section, we investigate whether going to a better high school—regardless
of tier—has an effect on high school peer composition and academic outcomes.
4.5.1.1 Peer effect composition
We first check whether going to a better school leads to better peer composition
in high school as measured by average high school entrance exam scores. In panel
A of Figure C1, we plot the mean high school entrance exam (HET) score at an
individual’s high school as a function of his/her HET score. These figures take the
same form as those after them in that open circles represent local averages over a 4
point score range. Further, all figures use a bandwidth of 50 HET test score points on
either side of the cutoff. Using a local quadratic fit, we find that average peer quality
significantly increases at the threshold that gives them to opportunity to access
better quality schooling. Specifically, threshold crossing leads to an improvement
in the average peer HET score in high school by 10.68 points—equivalent to 0.174
percent of a standard deviation in test scores.
In Table C2, we test the robustness of these results to various bandwidths and
the inclusion of controls. All point estimates represent treatment effects from sep-
arate local linear regressions using high school peer quality as an outcome variable.
Further, standard errors are clustered at the ID level.19 The optimal bandwidth
is selected using the CCT bandwidth selector.20 We report estimates from various
bandwidths relative to the optimal CCT bandwidth. Notably, results remain sta-
19Recall from section 4.4.2, identification using multiple between school cutoffs, can lead to
repeated observations.
20For our peer composition outcome variable, the CCT predicts an optimal bandwidth of 14 score
points on either side of the cutoff for local linear regressions (See Table C2).
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tistically significant at the 1% level with estimates ranging from 0.14 to 0.18 of a
standard deviation in HET test scores. Further, the inclusion of controls does not
change the treatment effect on peer quality composition—consistent with the iden-
tifying assumption. These controls include age, gender, district and middle school
fixed effects.
4.5.1.2 Academic outcomes
Next, we look at whether this documented increase in peer quality is associated
with improved academic performance. Specifically in Panel A of Figure C2, using a
local linear fit, we find that having the opportunity to access better schools does not
lead to better performance in the high-stakes Chinese college entrance exams (CET).
Further, in Panels A and B of Figure C3 we also show that threshold crossing does
not lead to an increase in the eligibility to attend any four year college and/or an
elite college.
In Table C3, we show that these results or not sensitive to choice of bandwidth
and the inclusion of controls. In all specifications, having the opportunity to access
higher quality schooling with better peers does not lead to an increase in college
entrance exam test scores, eligibility to attend a 4 year college and the eligibility of
attending an elite college.
4.5.1.3 Heterogeneous effects
One may wonder if females and males are differentially affected by the opportunity
to access higher quality schooling in terms of academic outcomes. Before doing so,
we first check whether females and males face significantly different peers when going
to a better school. Results indicate that both males and females are exposed to a
significant improvement in peer quality. Specifically, Panels B and C in Figure C1
indicate that males and females face an improvement in peer quality to the order of
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0.156 and 0.19 of a standard deviation in HET exam scores. Next, we check whether
this improvement in peer quality is associated with academic gains for a specific
gender. Consistent with the average treatment effects, we find no significant effect of
threshold crossing on the CET exam scores (Panels B and C of Figure C2), eligibility
to attend a four year college (Panels C and E of Figure C3) as well as eligibility to
attend an elite college (Panels D and F of Figure C3). All results from this gender
analysis are summarized in Table C4, with results remaining unchanged. We conclude
that having the opportunity to go to a better school leads to an improvement in the
quality of high school peers. It does not, however, result in an improvement in
college entrance exam scores or college outcomes. Further, these affects do not differ
by gender.
4.5.2 Going to a top tier high school
In this section, we investigate whether going to a tier-1 or elite high school has
an effect on high school peer composition and academic outcomes.
4.5.2.1 First stage and peer effect composition
Next, we turn to whether results change when focusing on a single between school
cutoff within a town. Notably, focusing on a single between school cutoff allows us to
also compute a ‘first stage’ for tier-1 eligible students. Specifically, using a quadratic
fit, Panel A of Figure C4 highlights that 51.6 percent of people who score above the
tier-1 threshold eventually attend a tier-1 school. We also check whether having the
opportunity to access a tier 1 high school is associated with an improvement in peer
quality. Similar to section 4.5.1.1, we find that having the opportunity to attend
a tier 1 high school leads to a significant improvement in peer quality. Panel B of
Figure C4 indicates that threshold crossing is associated with a 13.38 point increase
in peer HET scores—equivalent to 0.218 of a standard deviation in test scores.
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Table C5 highlights the robustness of these results to various bandwidths and
the inclusion of controls using local linear regressions. Similar to previous analysis,
controls include gender, age, district and middle school fixed effects. Further, stan-
dard errors are clustered at the running variable level, as suggested in Lee & Card
(2008), and reported in parentheses. Panel A indicates that the compliance ratio is
robust to various bandwidths and the inclusion of controls ranging from 52.2 to 57.2
percent. Further, Panel B shows that the documented discontinuity in high school
peer quality remains statistically significant at the 1% level. These estimates range
from 0.21 to 0.32 of a standard deviation in HET test scores.
4.5.2.2 Academic outcomes
We find that having access to a top tier school leads to an improvement in high
school peer composition. Next, we look at whether it also leads to an improvement
in academic outcomes. Panel A of Figure C5 is a graphical representation of CET
scores as a function of students’ HET scores. Using a local linear fit, we observe a
significant discontinuity in CET scores at the threshold to the order of 8.18 points.
To put things into perspective, this is equivalent to 0.084 of a standard deviation in
CET test scores.
We further check whether threshold crossing is associated with significant changes
in college outcomes. Panel B of Figure C5 reveals that having the opportunity to
access elite high schooling increases students’ eligibility in attending a four year
college by 10 percentage points. However, as evident from Panel C, it does not seem
to significantly increase the eligibility of attending an elite college.
Table C6 summarizes the reduced form impacts of having access to an elite school.
Panel A presents the effects of threshold crossing on the CET exam scores using local
linear regressions. The results are robust to various bandwidths and the addition
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of controls with estimates ranging from 0.052 to 0.096 of a standard deviation in
test scores. Panels B and C report estimates on the eligibility of attending a four
year college and an elite college respectively. Specifically, Panel B reveals that while
the estimates for four year college eligibility are generally positive and significant,
they are insignificant and imprecise for lower bandwidths. Panel C reveals that
estimates for elite college eligibility are statistically insignificant for all bandwidths,
yet economically meaningful.
4.5.2.3 Local average treatment versus intent to treat effects
All results reported thus far are intent to treat (ITT) estimates of the opportunity
to access higher quality schooling. In what follows, we present local average treatment
effects (LATE) attributed to attending a tier 1 high school. To do so, we re-weight
the reduced form impacts of threshold crossing by the first stage compliance ratio in a
2SLS framework, as in equation (4.2).21 In this section, we also present heterogeneous
estimates by gender in order to see if the average treatment effects are being driven
by a specific sex. Table C7 summarizes the ITT versus LATE estimates—for the
whole population and by gender—using a bandwidth of 40 score points on either
side of the cutoff. Further, all estimates are reported with the inclusion of controls
and standard errors are clustered at the running variable level.
Panel A of Table C7 presents estimates on the likelihood of attending a tier 1
high school, i.e. the first stage. We find that the likelihood of attending a tier 1
school increases discontinuously at the threshold by 52.3 percentage points. Further,
the first stage is similar in magnitude for both genders (53.1 for males versus 52.3
for females). Panel B presents ITT versus LATE estimates on high school peer
21In these specifications, elite school attendance is instrumented by scoring above the threshold
for elite schooling. Here, the exclusion restriction needed to be satisfied is that scoring just above
the threshold has no effects on future outcomes except through its effect on high school attendance,
a reasonable assumption.
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quality. Notably, the LATE effect of attending an elite high school is almost double
the ITT effect. Specifically, we find that attending an elite high school increases
the average peer quality a student is exposed to by 26 HET exam points—a 0.42
standard deviation improvement in peer test scores. These effects are similar for
both males and females.
In Panel C, we report ITT versus LATE estimates for academic outcomes. Specif-
ically, the effect of attending an elite high school on college entrance exam test scores
is 15.87 points, equivalent to 0.16 of a standard deviation improvement in CET test
scores. Strikingly, we also uncover substantial heterogeneity in the results. The ITT
and LATE effect on college entrance test scores are statistically insignificant for the
female population. On the other hand, attending an elite high school results in a 33
point test score improvement for males, equivalent to 0.34 of a standard deviation in
CET scores. With regards to college outcomes, attending a tier-1 high school leads
to a 15.7 percentage point increase in the eligibility of attending a four year college
for the overall population, with the effects again being driven by males (23 per-
centage points). As for elite college attendance, ITT and LATE estimates are both
statistically insignificant. Further, we observe no significant differences between both
genders. We conclude that elite school attendance has significant and sizable effects
on academic outcomes, mainly driven by the male population.
4.5.3 Robustness checks
4.5.3.1 Validity of the design
A concern with any regression discontinuity design is the ability for individu-
als to precisely control the assignment variable. This can occur if students and/or
graders of the Chinese high school entrance exam are able to manipulate test scores
in such a way that the distribution of unobservable determinants of education are
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discontinuous at the cutoff. This is highly unlikely in the context of the Chinese
high school entrance exam as cutoff scores for each high school are only assigned
after the exams are administered and graded. Specifically, all high school cutoffs are
determined based on high school applicants’ percentile rank—calculated after grades
are determined. Further, any identifying information linking a student to an exam
is unobservable to graders.
To formally address these concerns, we plot the distribution of test scores for all
students taking the high school entrance exam in the year 2007.22 Panels A and
B of Figure C8 show the distribution of the 2007 high school entrance exam test
scores using a bin width of 2 score points for both empirical analyses.23 Both figures
reveal no evidence of potential manipulation around the normalized thresholds for
admission into better quality schooling.
An alternative test for the validity of an RD design is to check for the smoothness
of baseline covariates known to affect outcomes (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Our data set
does not provide for a rich set of predetermined characteristics that affect academic
outcomes. The only meaningful background information we are able to observe
are students’ gender and age when taking the HET. In panels C and D of Figure
C8, the outcome of interest is students’ predicted high school entrance exam scores
conditional on sex, gender, district and middle school attended. Panel C plots the
predicted HET score as a function of the actual scores for our multiple between school
cutoff strategy, i.e. going to a better school. We observe no significant discontinuity
at the threshold in terms of predicted scores. Similarly, in Panel D, we observe no
significant discontinuity in predicted tests scores at the threshold for top-tier high
22For consistency with previous results, this distribution is conditional on a student being ob-
served with a CET exam score also.
23Recall, the population of students remain the same in both empirical strategies. However,
Panel A contains more data points as individuals can be observed more than once depending on
their relative position to a high school cutoff.
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school eligibility. Table C8 looks at the robustness of these local linear results to
varying bandwidths. Panel A deals with estimating threshold crossing effects for
attending a top-tier school, while Panel B deals with the case of going to a better
school, regardless of tier. All estimates remain statistically insignificant for a range
of different bandwidths. In Appendix Figure C9 and Table C9, we report threshold
crossing effects for our baseline covariates separately.
4.5.3.2 Selection into the college entrance exam
The population of interest in this study consists of students whom have an ob-
served high school and college entrance exam score. However, it remains a question as
to whether selection into the college entrance exam is correlated with school quality
and thus treatment—leading to potential bias in the estimation of academic out-
comes. To investigate this, we match our current dataset to data containing the
population of high school test score takers. Particularly, students who do not match
are assumed to have not taken the college entrance exam.24 We then check whether
going to a better quality high school is correlated with treatment. Panel A of Figure
C10 suggests that selection is not an issue when estimating the effects of attending
a better high school. On the other hand, Panel B reveals that selection could be an
issue when looking at the effects of attending a tier-1 school. In fact, students who
attend top tier high schools are 1.69 percentage points more likely to take the CET.
This result is consistent with ex ante expectations seeing as having the most number
of students possible take the exam is a primary objective of a top quality high school.
This suggests that marginal students who attend non-tier 1 schools are less likely
to take the exam which would potentially lead us to underestimate any test score
24Using this matching procedure, we estimate that 91% of students entering high school sat for
the CET exam. This is in line with official aggregate data for the districts being analyzing, which
suggests that 90 to 94 percent of students take the CET exam with results varying from year to
year.
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treatment effects attributed to school quality. In Panels D and F of Figure C10,
we investigate whether this selection effect differs by gender. Notably, the figures
suggest that selection into the CET is driven by the female population.
We investigate the robustness of these results in Table C10. Panel B reveals that
selection is not an issue for either gender when focusing on the effects of going to a
better high school. On the other hand, results from Panel A suggest that while these
estimates are not robust to varying bandwidths, selection into the CET exam may
be a potential problem for our single between school cutoff strategy, i.e. going to a
tier-1 school. Specifically, and although imprecise, this selection seems to be driven
by the female population. This seems plausible as females not attending a top tier
high school in rural China may be more likely to be discouraged by their parents’
from pursuing their education.25. The next section deals with the potential for se-
lection using a formal bounding analysis. Further, to the extent to which selection
is driven by gender, all results in section 4.5 are reported with and without controls
for gender, with the results remaining fairly unchanged.
4.5.3.3 Bounding analysis
To investigate the extent to which selection into the CET exam could potentially
bias our results, we conduct a formal bound analysis using the trimming procedure
suggested in Lee (2009). The intuition behind this test is as follows. To find a
lower bound (worst case scenario) for the estimated impact of treatment on college
exam scores, we assume that only the worst students attending the most selective
high schools, who would have otherwise dropped out, select into the exam. Thus,
25This could also potentially explain results from the previous section indicating that the likeli-
hood of observing a female in the sample is higher at the tier 1 cutoff for some bandwidths. See
Appendix Table C9.
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dropping the bottom distribution of the treatment group makes it comparable to the
control group . Formally, the share of students to be trimmed from the treatment
group is derived from the treatment estimate of the likelihood of selecting into the
college entrance exam.26 A similar procedure—trimming the top performing students
in the treatment group—is used to estimate the upper bound (Best case scenario).
Table C11 summarizes the updated local linear regressions by comparing previous
college test score RD estimates with those estimated using the trimming analysis.27.
For consistency and comparability, we use the same bandwidths as the college en-
trance exam score regressions in Table C6. We present lower and upper bound
estimates for all bandwidths, although the only significant specification arises from
using a bandwidth of 51 score points. Notably, the lower and upper bound estimates
from this specification remains positive and significant ranging from 8.12 to 13.89
points compared to the original estimate of 8.034. This suggests that selection into
the CET exam does not bias our results in a meaningful way. We conclude that the
potential for selection in the CET exam does not alter our results or conclusions.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Interpretation of results
We show that having the opportunity to access a better quality high school in
China, regardless of tier, is associated with an improvement in the average peer
quality a student is exposed to. The magnitude of this improvement ranges from 0.15
to 0.17 of a standard deviation in HET scores. However, this is not associated with
26For example, using a local linear regression of bandwidth =50, we estimate that students are
1.69 percentage points more likely to select into the college entrance exam at the cutoff. To estimate
the total percent of students to be trimmed, we merely divide 1.69 by the mean proportion of test
takers for the control group at the threshold (90.5%). This results in us trimming 1.85 percent of
the data.
27Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses for the lower and upper bound esti-
mates
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improved performance in the high stakes college entrance exam. Similarly, having the
opportunity to access a tier-1 school also leads to a significant improvement in peer
quality, to the order of 0.19 to 0.26 of a standard deviation in peer HET scores. This
is associated with an improvement in performance on the national college entrance
exams by 0.06 to 0.1 of a standard deviation, ultimately leading to a significant
increase in the eligibility of attending a four year college. Our results are driven
by the male population and are in line with recent research suggesting that being
exposed to worse peers has more of a negative effect on boys as opposed to girls (See
for example, Carrell & Hoekstra, 2010).
To the extent that peer effects are not highly non-linear in ability, differences in
peer composition cannot fully explain the variation in academic outcomes we observe.
For illustration, if peer effects were driving the results, then a 10.68 improvement in
peer quality from going to a better school (See Figure C1, panel A) should lead to
at least a 6.52 point increase in college entrance exam scores.28 However, as evident
from Panel A of Figure C2, we are able to rule out any effects larger than 2.7 points.
To investigate further, we look at whether school and teacher characteristics
discontinuously change at either cutoff. Specifically, using school level data, we look
at whether class composition, teacher quality and gender significantly differ at the
threshold.29 Figure C11 reveals the results of this exercise. All panels on the left
relate to going to a tier 1 school while those on the right deal with the case of going
to a better school, regardless of tier. Panel A of Figure C11 indicates that there are
around 2 more students per classroom at tier 1 high schools.30 This is most likely
28These results are extrapolated from Panel B of Figure C4 and Panel A of Figure C5 where
having access to a tier 1 school is associated with a 13.38 improvement in peer test scores leading
to a significant improvement in college test scores by 8.18 points. Formally, (8.18 * 10.68)/ 13.38
= 6.52.
29For this analysis, we present figures linking the school level data to our original individual level
data. Accordingly, inference may be an issue here, so we stick to showing visual evidence.
30This is consistent with previous findings in China (See for example, Ding & Lehrer, 2007) and
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attributed to the fact that tier 1 high schools are in such high demand in China.
Panel B reveals no significant class size effect when focusing on multiple between
school cutoffs.
Next, we check whether teacher quality varies at either threshold. Notably, as
mentioned earlier, China has a unique way of ranking teachers according to their
performance. Specifically, rather than focus on teacher attributes related to highest
degree attained and years of experience, we focus on the number of students to su-
perior (advanced rank) teachers in a school. In fact, Park & Hannum (2001) show
that the quality ranks used in the Chinese schooling system contain a substantial
amount of information on teacher quality that is not contained in conventional mea-
sures such as education of the teacher and years of experience. Panel C of Figure
C11 reveals that the number of students to superior teachers falls by about 100—a
100 percent reduction—at the threshold. Put differently, the normalized number of
superior teachers doubles at the threshold for attending a tier-1 school. On the other
hand, Panel D indicates that this is not the case for a attending a better school,
regardless of tier, as we observe no significant discontinuity at the threshold. These
results are consistent with our previous results suggesting that peer effects alone can-
not explain the variation in academic outcomes between both sets of identification
strategies. They also suggest that teacher quality may have more of an impact on
academic outcomes than peer effects. This is consistent with Park & Hannum (2001)
who find suggestive evidence that much of the variation in Chinese elementary test
scores (at least one fourth) is likely due to teacher differences.
Finally, we look at whether teacher gender differs at the cutoff. Specifically,
we find no evidence of a compelling difference in teacher gender at the cutoff for
attending a better school (Panel F) or a tier-1 school (Panel E), although the trends
is in contrast to what you would expect in top high schools in the U.S.
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are different. This suggests that teacher gender does not explain the differences in
academic outcomes by student gender as in Carrell et. al (2010).31
4.6.2 Threats to interpretation
One may wonder whether other factors unrelated to peer and school quality may
be driving the results for academic outcomes. For instance, if going to to a tier
1 high school increases the likelihood of a student choosing a scientific track, then
perhaps our results are mechanical in the sense that only students entering a scientific
track witness an improvement in test scores, regardless of school quality.32 To test
for this, we check whether the probability of choosing an arts versus science track
is discontinuous at the threshold for attending a tier 1 high school. Panel A of
Appendix Figure C12 indicates that this is not a concern, as there is no significant
change in the likelihood of entering into the arts track at the cutoff.
We also check whether age when taking the college entrance exam differs at the
threshold for attending a tier 1 high school. Indeed, if tier-1 high schools were more
likely to have their worse students repeat a grade, then perhaps the documented
improvement in test scores in the 2010 college entrance exam is purely mechanical. 33
To test for this, we check if age at time of CET exam administration is discontinuous
at the threshold for attending a tier-1 high school. Panel B of Figure C12 reveals
this not to be the case, as we observe no significant difference in age at time of CET
examination at the threshold.
31We must note however, that we have data only for all teachers (regardless of rank). There
could still be substantial variation in the number of female versus male superior teachers.
32Recall, a student does not choose his/her track upon entry into high school. This choice is
made in the 2nd year of high school.
33Although, we must note, grade repetition is far from common practice in China.
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4.6.3 Long run outcomes
We have documented a significant increase in academic performance attributed
to going to a tier 1 or elite high school. Further our LATE estimates imply that
going to a tier 1 high school results in a 15 percent increase in the eligibility of
attending a four year college. Naturally, one may wonder how these results extend
into the long run—particularly into the labor market. While we do not have in
sample information on earnings and employment for our population of interest, we
draw from other studies to infer labor market returns to attending a tier 1 high
school. Specifically, Giles et. al (2015) estimate a 37% return to attending a four
year college in China. Similarly, Li et. al (2005) estimate that the return to each year
of college is as much as 10%. While we are unable to see whether a student attends
or graduates a four year college, our results indicate a significant 15% increase in
the eligibility of attending a four year college. Given the importance of education in
China, a large amount of students will end up taking this opportunity. This suggests
significantly large labor market returns to attending a tier 1 high school in China.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we estimate the academic gains of having the opportunity to
attend a higher quality high school. To do so, we use a regression discontinuity
design that compares the academic outcomes of students who are barely eligible and
barely ineligible to enter a high school of higher quality in three rural districts in
China. Specifically, in this paper we draw a distinction between attending a better
quality school, regardless of tier, and an elite high school. We find that having the
opportunity to access better quality education results in a similar improvement in
peer quality regardless of school tier. However, we find that only students who have
access to a tier-1 high school witness an improvement in the high stakes college
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entrance exam. This leads to an increases in students’ eligibility to attend a four
year college, but not an elite college. We also find that these academic gains are
driven by the male population despite both genders facing the same peer and school
environment. Further, we find that the LATE estimates of attending a tier-1 school
are approximately twice those of the ITT estimates of having the opportunity to
access a tier-1 high school.
Assuming that peer effects are not highly non-linear in ability, we show that stu-
dents’ high school peer environment alone cannot explain the disparity in academic
outcomes between going to an elite high school versus a better high school. Ac-
cordingly, utilizing a unique teacher rank designation in China, we provide evidence
suggesting that variation in teacher quality may explain the disparity in results.
Our results have significant policy implications. First, while it remains an open
question as to the extent to which our results apply to other settings, they suggest
that the academic benefits to attending a top quality high school are sizable. As a
result, expanding marginal students’ access to elite high schools may result in signifi-
cant gains in the college and the labor market. Finally, exploiting the unique setting
of China, we find evidence suggesting that teacher quality has sizable effects on stu-
dents’ academic performance and potentially later lifetime outcomes. This suggests
that a system of rewarding teachers based on performance may have potential merits.
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The three essays that compromise this dissertation have looked at the short and
long run consequences of educational choices. In Chapter 2, we show that conscrip-
tion policy leads to an increase in educational attainment—consistent with draft
avoidance behavior. We further show that military service in itself does not affect
labor market outcomes, suggesting that the returns to education induced by draft
avoidance is zero. In Chapter 3, we find that increasing access to higher quality
education—characterized by increased enrollment in a STEM major and in an insti-
tution with better performing peers—leads to a 13.6 percent earnings premium for
low skilled students. In Chapter 4, we conclude that high school quality matters in
terms of future academic performance—conditional on attending an elite high school.
Further results suggest that this is mainly due to superior teaching quality in elite
schools as opposed to improved peer quality.
All three essays use a regression discontinuity design, allowing us to overcome the
problem of selection into education. While an RD design yields as good as random
variation in treatment, this can often come at a cost to external validity. To the extent
that our results generalize to other settings, they have significant policy implications.
First, incentivized education—independent of the usual incentives to education—may
not always lead to positive lifetime outcomes. Specifically, maximizing educational
attainment, without granting students the right complements to education, can lead
to undesirable outcomes. Second, increasing access to better quality education for
low-skilled students can lead to significant labor market gains. Finally, our results
also suggest that teacher quality matters more than peer quality for high school
students. While more research on this matter is needed before generalizing any
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conclusions, the results do suggest that a system of compensating teachers based on
student performance could be an effective tool.
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APPENDIX A
Figure A.1: Likelihood of conscription based on birth year relative to Jan 1, 1979
cutoff.
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Estimated Discontinuity = 0.23(0.02)
• Notes: Sample includes French male citizens and is taken from the Enquete 1998 a 10 ans.
Standard errors reported in parantheses.
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Figure A.2: Organization of high school in France.
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Figure A.3: Organization of higher education routes in France.
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Figure A.4: Years of education estimates based on birth month relative to Jan 1,
1979 cutoff.
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(a) Global quadratic graph.
13
.5
14
.5
15
.5
16
.5
Ye
ar
s 
of
 e
du
ca
tio
n
−20 −10 0 10 20
Month−year of birth
3 month bin averages Local Linear RHS fit
Local Linear LHS fit
 Estimated discontinuity = 0.62 (0.2)
(b) Local Linear graph.
0
.
5
1
Ad
di
tio
na
l y
ea
rs
 o
f e
du
ca
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50
Bandwidth
Treatment estimates 95% C.I.
(c) Bandwidth sensitivity analysis for local
linear regression.
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Figure A.5: Years of education residuals based on birth month relative to Jan 1,
1979 cutoff (Global quadratic graph).
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Figure A.6: Years of education residuals based on birth month relative to Jan 1,
1979 cutoff (Local linear graph).
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• Notes: Controls used include month of birth fixed effects, a dummy for middle school enroll-
ment as well as father’s occupation.
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Figure A.7: College graduation rates based on birth month relative to Jan 1, 1979
cutoff (Global quartic graph).
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Figure A.8: High school graduation rates based on birth month relative to Jan 1,
1979 cutoff (Global quartic graph).
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Figure A.9: Labor market outcomes based on birth month relative to Jan 1, 1979
cutoff (Global quadratic graphs).
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(a) Employment rates.
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(b) Monthly wages.
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(c) Log monthly wages.
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(d) Hourly wages.
Notes: Sample includes employed and unemployed French male citizens with at least 10 hours of
weekly work (conditional on employment). All regression estimates are weighted by population.
Standard errors are clustered at the birth-month year and reported in parentheses.
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Figure A.10: Distributional treatment effects on monthly earnings.
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(a) Local linear regressions of h=30 months.
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(b) Global quadratic regressions.
Notes: Solid and dashed lines represents the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals respec-
tively. Sample includes French male citizens. All regression estimates are weighted by population.
Standard errors are clustered at the birth-month year and reported in parentheses.
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Figure A.11: Distribution of birth month-year (running variable) near Jan 1, 1979
birth cutoff.
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French male citizens (employed +unemployed).
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Figure A.12: Testing for the smoothness of predetermined characteristics (middle
school enrollment) around cutoff using a global quartic graph.
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Figure A.13: Testing for the smoothness of predetermined characteristics (father’s
occupation) around cutoff using a global linear graph.
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Notes: All regression estimates are weighted by population. Standard errors are clustered at the
birth-month year and reported in parentheses.
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Figure A.14: Female outcomes based on birth-year month relative to Jan 1, 1979
cutoff (Global quadratic graphs).
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(a) Female years of education.
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(b) Female college graduation.
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(c) Female high school graduation.
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(d) Female employment rates
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(e) Female monthly earnings
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(f) Female logged earnings
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Figure A.15: Placebo test - T-statistics for reduced form effects on years of education
using various fake cutoff dates.
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Notes: Sample includes French male citizens. Each open circle represents the t-statistic from
a local linear regression of bandwidth = 24 months using years of education as the dependent
variable. Month Zero is the ’real’ cutoff date, and I simulate 50 fake cutoff months to the right
and left of that point. Clustered standard errors used to compute all t-stats.
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Figure A.16: Years of education for individuals with only primary schooling com-
pleted (Global linear graph).
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Figure A.17: Earnings for individuals with only primary schooling completed (Global
linear graph.)
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• Notes: Sample includes French male citizens who have completed only primary schooling.
All regression estimates are weighted by population. Standard errors are clustered at the
birth-month year and reported in parentheses.
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Figure A.18: Years of job market experience (Global quadratic graph).
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• Notes: All regression estimates are weighted by population. Standard errors are clustered at
the birth-month year and reported in parentheses.
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Table A.1: Male conscription rates based on birth year.
Birth cohort year All Males Low S.E.S High S.E.S No. of Observations
1974 0.531 0.545 0.528 452
1975 0.485 0.525 0.454 538
1976 0.556 0.559 0.567 652
1977 0.376 0.397 0.361 789
1978 0.271 0.268 0.300 849
1979 0 0 0 711
1980 0 0 0 572
Source: Generation 1998 a` 10 ans
Socioeconomic Status (S.E.S) determined by father’s occupation and based on official
French classification of jobs.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics for French male citizens of birth cohorts 1975 to 1982
as of 2011.
Variable Mean
Years of Education 14.77
(3.036)
Monthly Earnings (in Euros) 1682.1
(1057.9)
Log Monthly Earnings 7.481
(0.427)
Hourly Wage (in Euros) 12.27
(4.891)
Employment rate 0.907
(0.290)
Hours Worked per week 40.88
(10.10)
High S.E.S 0.331
(0.46)
Middle school enrollment 0.993
(0.0819)
High School graduation rate 0.668
(0.471)
University graduation rate 0.240
(0.427)
Observations 8117
Mean outcomes reported; Standard deviation in parentheses.
*Data is taken from the French Labor Force Survey 2011 for male birth cohorts 1975 to 1982.
Since the dataset is not balanced, the number of observations used to compute each variable
does not necessarily match with the number of observations reported.
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Table A.3: Regression discontinuity estimates for years of education using different bandwidths and specifications.
Bandwidth 8 months 20 months 23 months 30 months 40 months 40 months 60 months 80 months Global
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Panel A: no controls
Discontinuity .505*** .516** .624*** .477*** .414*** .575** .539*** .593*** .581***
(.16) (.19) (.20) (.17) (.14) (.22) (.17) (.20) (.22)
Panel B: Controls .461** .450** .548*** .362** .357** .488** .397** .497** .478**
(.16) (.17) (.17) (.14) (.15) (.21) (.17) (.21) (.23)
Observations 1340 3341 3822 4999 6622 6622 10051 13446 18975
Month Polynomial Zero One One One One Two Two Three Four
Notes: Sample includes French male citizens.
Each cell represents a separate regression with years of education as the dependent variable and the treatment variable ’born before
January 1, 1979’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of age in which the slope is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the month-year level and reported in parentheses. All regressions have been weighted by population.
Our preferred specification is the one using bandwidth of 23 months which has been computed using the method proposed in
Calonico et. al (2014).
Controls include: 1) Birth month fixed effects (when bandwidth chosen is over a year) 2) A binary variable for middle school enrollment
3) father’s occupation.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table A.4: Regression discontinuity estimates for college/high school graduation rates using different bandwidths and
specifications.
Bandwidth 4 months 8 months 12 months 20 months 30 months 40 months 50 months 60 months Global
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Panel A: Discontinuity
in college grad. .008 –.005 .014 .007 .028 .021 .001 .010 .027
(.04) (.03) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Panel B: Discontinuity
in high school grad. –.016 .008 .013 .006 .012 .012 .007 .005 .003
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Month Polynomial Zero Zero Zero One One Two Three Three four
Observations 633 1332 1991 3334 4992 6616 8254 10036 18985
Notes: Sample includes French male citizens.
High school graduation defined as finishing any Baccalaureate type (Professional, technical, general)
Each cell represents a separate regression with graduation rates as the dependent variables and the treatment variable being ’born before
January 1, 1979’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of age in which the slope is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the month-year level and reported in parentheses. All regressions have been weighted by population.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table A.5: Regression discontinuity estimates for labor market outcomes using different bandwidths and specifications.
Bandwidth 6 months 14 months 20 months 30 months 40 months 50 months 60 months Global
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Panel A: Discontinuity
in employment. .024 .033 .012 .016 .026 .019 .027 .019
(.014) (.021) (.021) (.017) (.021) (.019) (.019) (.014)
Panel B: Discontinuity
in monthly earnings. 66.240 124.720 63.256 68.971 111.583 66.293 70.013 51.143
(84.070) (119.271) (89.762) (74.086) (95.246) (83.977) (80.078) (63.066)
Panel C: Discontinuity
in log wages. –.032 –.014 .004 .016 .010 –.001 .000 .015
(.027) (.043) (.033) (.029) (.036) (.032) (.030) (.024)
Panel D: Discontinuity
in hourly earnings. .053 .381 .245 .106 .244 .208 .091 –.132
(.479) (.637) (.481) (.396) (.493) (.444) (.415) (.335)
Month Polynomial Zero One One One Two Two Two Two
Observations 700 1649 2386 3601 4755 5956 7231 13779
Notes: Sample includes French male citizens.
Wages include zero earners, but logged wages drops those unemployed. Hourly wages are conditional on at least 10 weekly hours.
Each cell represents a separate regression with different labor market outcome dependent variables and the treatment variable being ’born
before January 1, 1979’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of age in which the slope is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the month-year level and reported in parentheses. All regressions have been weighted by population.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table A.6: Regression discontinuity estimates for individuals from low versus high socioeconomic backgrounds.
Socioecon. Char. Low S.E.S Low S.E.S Low S.E.S Low S.E.S High S.E.S High S.E.S High S.E.S High S.E.S
Global Degree Local Linear L.L BW* Global Degree Local Linear L.L. BW*
Panel A: Discont.
in years of educ. .23 2 .23 23 .57** 2 .96*** 19
(.19) (.3) (.25) (.35)
Panel B: Discont.
in high school grad. –.025 4 –.017 33 .03 4 .034 37
(.045) (.035) (0.04) (.032)
Panel C: Discont.
in college grad. –.029 4 –.028 19 .10 4 .08 24
(.04) (.037) (.084) (.075)
Panel D: Discont.
in employment .016 2 .022 28 –.007 2 –.015 25
(.02) (.027) (.02) (.032)
Panel E: Discont.
in monthly wages –11.75 2 –5.17 29 –8.9 2 54.6 29
(71) (93.13) (150.59) (184.25)
Panel F: Discont.
in logged wages –.025 2 –.046 21 .051 2 .059 30
(.03) (.041) (.052) (.063)
Panel G: Discont.
in hourly wages –.35 2 –.47 26 .012 2 .31 36
(.33) (.43) (.87) (.99)
Observations 9520 1858 4966 933
* L.L. BW = Local linear bandwidth estimated using the CCT method. All regressions have been weighted by population.
Sample includes French male citizens. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year level and reported in parentheses.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table A.7: Regression discontinuity estimates for controls using different bandwidths and specifications.
Bandwidth 8 months 12 months 23 months 30 months 40 months 50 months 60 months 80 months Global
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Panel A: Middle
school enrollment
discontinuity .001 .002 .000 .002 .000 .004 .003 .003 .000
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Panel B: Father’s
occupation disc. .020 .004 .010 .015 .009 .010 .023 .016 .034
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Month Polynomial Zero Zero One One One Two Two Three Four
Observations 1340 1998 3813 4987 6608 8244 10029 13426 18973
Notes: Sample includes French male citizens.
Each cell represents a separate regression with years of education as the dependent variable and the treatment variable ’born before
January 1, 1979’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of age in which the slope is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the month-year level and reported in parentheses. All regressions have been weighted by population
weights.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table A.8: Placebo regression discontinuity estimates for females using different bandwidths and specifications.
Bandwidth 10 months 20 months 30 months 40 months 50 months Global
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Female discont. in years of educ. –.187 –.230 –.255 –.297 –.365 –.065
(.17) (.26) (.20) (.26) (.24) (.16)
Panel B: Female discont. in high school grad. –.048** –.074** –.061** –.071** –.082*** –.035
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02)
Panel C: Female discont. in college grad. –.043 –.068* –.021 –.063 –.059 .003
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Panel D: Female discont. in employment rates .009 .005 –.017 –.005 –.014 –.016
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01)
Panel E: Female discont. in monthly earnings 29.703 41.614 –4.805 28.358 28.910 –13.847
(68.86) (110.23) (81.36) (118.39) (101.00) (58.24)
Panel F: Female discont. in logged earnings .024 .064 .042 .070 .075 .046
(.04) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.04)
Panel G: Female discont. in hourly earnings .267 .364 .460 .550 .524 .239
(.37) (.59) (.47) (.65) (.57) (.34)
Month Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Two
Observations 1073 2290 3433 4556 5773 13463
Notes: Sample includes only female French citizens. Standard errors are clustered by birth month-year and reported in parentheses.
All regressions are weighted by population.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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APPENDIX B
Figure B.1: Distribution of scores on the first round of the French Baccalaureate in
the year 2002.
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(a) Distribution of all students taking the
exam.
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(b) Distribution of remaining students after
dropping all heaped data.
Notes: Sample includes students who took the exam in the first round of the
year 2002. Histograms reported with bin width of 0.05 points. Panel B drops
all individuals scoring within 0.25 points to the left and 0.1 points to the right
of each significant cutoff.
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Figure B2: Testing for the smoothness of baseline characteristics.
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(a) National exam scores in French in grade
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.158 (0.18)
(b) Brevet exam scores in grade 9.
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.847 (0.661)
(c) Mathematics exam scores in grade 6.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.022 (0.052)
(d) Socioeconomic status/
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.0029 (0.048)
(e) Gender.
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.098 (0.096)
(f) Birth order.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.138 (0.12)
(g) Number of siblings.
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.015 (0.045)
(h) Earnings survey response rate.
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Figure B3: Predicted score based on baseline characteristics.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.028 (0.129)
(a) Local linear.
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(b) Global quadratic.
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Covariates include:
Scores on the oral and written portion of the Grade 11 national French exam,
Score on the Brevet exam in grade 9, mathematics scores on the grade 6 exam,
socioeconomics status, number of siblings, birth order, place of residence and
gender.
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Figure B4: Likelihood of passing in the first round based on first round scores of the
French Baccalaureate exam (Global linear graph).
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Notes: Sample includes students who took the exam in the first round of the
year 2002. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure B5: Quantity of education effects based on first round scores of the French
Baccalaureate exam.
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(a) Likelihood of attaining a high school de-
gree.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.0046 (0.043)
(b) Likelihood of attaining a post-
Baccalaureate degree.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.071 (0.17)
(c) Years of post-Baccalaureate education.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.393 (0.193)
(d) Age at post-Baccalaureate graduation.
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure B6: Quantity of education effects based on first round scores of the French
Baccalaureate exam (Global polynomial graphs).
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(a) Likelihood of attaining a high school de-
gree.
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(b) Likelihood of attaining a post-
Baccalaureate degree.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.081 (0.136)
(c) Years of post-Baccalaureate education.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.318 (0.212)
(d) Age at post-Baccalaureate graduation.
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure B7: Quality of education effects based on first round scores of the French
Baccalaureate exam.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.260 (0.086)
(a) Average Baccalaureate score by attended
institution.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.159(0.045)
(b) Likelihood of attending STEM major.
Notes: Standard errors clustered by university and reported in parentheses (Robust
standard errors used for STEM estimates).
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Figure B8: Quality of education effects based on first round scores of the French
Baccalaureate exam (Global polynomial graphs).
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(a) Average Baccalaureate score by attended
institution.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.144(0.045)
(b) Likelihood of attending STEM major.
Notes: Standard errors clustered by university and reported in parentheses (Robust
standard errors used for STEM estimates).
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Figure B9: Quality of education ‘graduation’ effects based on first round scores of
the French Baccalaureate exam.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.247 (0.076)
(a) Average Baccalaureate score by gradu-
ated institution.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.107(0.042)
(b) Likelihood of graduating STEM major.
Standard errors clustered by university and reported in parentheses (Robust stan-
dard errors used for STEM estimates).
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Figure B10: Labor market effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalau-
reate exam.
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(a) Likelihood of employment.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 252.03 (72.57)
(b) Monthly earnings(in Euros).
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.128 (0.043)
(c) Monthly logged earnings.
Notes: Wages are stacked for the two most recent years provided(2010-2011).
Standard errors clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
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Figure B11: Labor market effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalau-
reate exam (Global polynomial graphs).
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.009 (0.028)
(a) Likelihood of employment.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.122 (0.044)
(b) Monthly logged earnings.
Notes: Wages are stacked for the two most recent years provided(2010-2011).
Standard errors clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
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Figure B12: Distribution of scores on the first round of the French Baccalaureate in
the year 2002 within a 9 to 11 test score grade window.
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Notes: Histogram reported with bin width of 0.05 points.
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Figure B13: Placebo test - T-statistics for reduced form effects on logged monthly
wages using various fake cutoff scores.
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Notes: Each open circle represents the t-statistic from a local linear regression of band-
width = 1.5 Baccalaureate points, using logged monthly wages as the dependent variable.
A grade of zero on the x-axis represents the original passing threshold grade of 10, and
we simulate 50 fake cutoff treatment effects to the right and left of that point within
intervals of 0.1 score points. Clustered standard errors are used for computation of
t-stats.
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Figure B14: Discontinuity in earnings for individuals who never attended college
(Global polynomial graph).
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.099 (0.096)
Notes: Wages are stacked for the two most recent years provided(2010-2011). Standard
errors clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
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Figure B15: Discontinuity in age at graduation from secondary school.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.024 (0.041)
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table B.1: Classification of majors into STEM and non-STEM degrees.
appendix.pdf
1. STEM designated majors
Agricultural sciences
Economic sciences
Engineering
Fundamental sciences and applications
Life sciences, health and earth sciences
Materials sciences
Medical degrees
Pharmacy
Sciences and technology
2. Non-STEM majors
Accounting degrees
Arts
Higher technical certificate of production
Higher technical certificate of services
Languages
Paramedical degrees
Political Sciences
Professional degrees
Social sciences and humanities degrees
Social work degrees
Sports
Technical degrees
1
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Table B.2: Summary statistics for students who sat for the first round of the 2002
general Baccalaureate exam.
Variable Mean
Male 0.38
(0.48)
Birth order 1.74
(0.95)
Number of siblings 1.68
(1.17)
High S.E.S. 0.57
(0.49)
[0.2em] Score on the Brevet exam 13.7
(1.95)
Score on the French oral exam 12.2
(2.93)
Score on the French written exam 10.2
(2.94)
Score on the Baccalaureate exam 11.17
(2.24)
Percentage of first time passers 0.75
(0.43)
High school graduation rate 0.98
(0.14)
Years of Post-Baccalaureate education 3.2
(1.63)
STEM enrollment rate 0.28
(0.45)
Employment rate in 2011 and 2012 0.93
(0.25)
Monthly earnings in 2011 (in Euros) 1625
(818)
Monthly earnings in 2012 (in Euros) 1725
(881)
Observations 4337
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
The number of observations represents students with reported grades on the first round of the 2002
General Baccalaureate exam.
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Table B.3: Regression discontinuity estimates for baseline covariates.
Bandwidth 0.25 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in Grade 11 French exam –.119 –.098 .020 –.260 –.044 .042
(.26) (.24) (.20) (.26) (.24) (.24)
Panel B: Discontinuity in Brevet exam in grade 9 .250 .131 .158 .193 .160 .101
(.24) (.23) (.19) (.25) (.23) (.23)
Panel C: Discontinuity in National Grade 6 Maths exam .424 .034 –.516 –1.323 –.352 –.786
(1.06) (1.09) (.88) (1.18) (1.10) (1.05)
Panel D: Discontinuity in S.E.S .011 .094 .023 .037 .049 .049
(.07) (.07) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Panel E: Discontinuity in Gender –.057 .002 .003 –.019 –.025 –.030
(.07) (.06) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Panel F: Discontinuity in birth order .001 –.021 –.098 –.019 –.088 –.154
(.13) (.13) (.10) (.13) (.12) (.12)
Panel G:: Discontinuity in number of siblings .080 .205 .138 .228 .103 .098
(.14) (.14) (.12) (.15) (.14) (.14)
Panel H:: Discontinuity in prob. of being in earnings survey .045 –.020 –.016 –.010 –.011 .018
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 401 1310 1855 2314 2717 3802
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Socioeconomic status proxied by father’s occupation.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table B.4: Regression discontinuity estimates for quantity of education measures.
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in likelihood of ever
graduating secondary school .010 .003 .003 –.005 –.008 .045**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02)
With Controls .012 .003 .009 –.000 –.003 .045**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Panel B: Discontinuity in likelihood of having
a post Baccalaureate degree .050 .019 .005 –.018 .016 .023
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.05)
With Controls .051 .007 .003 –.016 .013 .003
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Panel C: Discontinuity in years of Post-Bacc. education .304** .125 .071 .051 .070 .065
(.14) (.21) (.17) (.23) (.21) (.21)
With Controls .355** .185 .151 .172 .139 .079
(.16) (.23) (.18) (.24) (.22) (.22)
Panel D: Discontinuity in age at Post-Bacc. graduation 0.201 0.191 0.393** 0.361 0.332 0.317
(0.15) (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
With Controls .273 .229 .450** .396 .355 .288
(.18) (.26) (.21) (.28) (.25) (.25)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 679 1310 1855 2316 2720 3807
Notes: Controls include exam specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings,birth order, socioeconomic status,
scores on the Brevet examination, score on the grade 11 national French exam and scores in grade 6 national assessment exam in
mathematics. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
143
Table B.5: Regression discontinuity estimates for education quality measures using different bandwidths and specifica-
tions.
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in average
institution Baccalaureate score .217*** .246** .261*** .307** .260*** .292**
(.07) (.10) (.09) (.12) (.10) (.12)
With Controls .222*** .233** .257*** .293*** .234*** .259***
(.07) (.09) (.07) (.10) (.08) (.09)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
likelihood of being
in STEM major .107*** .124** .159*** .151** .160*** .170***
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.05)
With Controls .116*** .115** .161*** .157*** .167*** .163***
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 630 1254 1793 2245 2641 3715
Notes: Controls include exam specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings,birth order, socioeco-
nomic status, scores on the Brevet examination, score on the grade 11 national French exam and scores in grade
6 national assessment exam in Mathematics. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by
university and reported in parentheses (Robust standard errors used for STEM estimates)
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Table B.6: Regression discontinuity estimates for labor market outcomes using different bandwidths and specifications.
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in Employment rates –.019 –.029 –.008 –.015 .009 .002
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
With Controls –.033 –.035 –.020 –.024 .006 –.003
(.02) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Panel B: Discontinuity in net monthly earnings 250.29*** 343.57*** 252.03*** 340.58*** 279.5*** 255.40***
(62.59) (92.57) (72.57) (96.56) (87.96) (88.00)
With Controls 218.58*** 275.13*** 242.72*** 313.47*** 243.42*** 222.49**
(63.15) (93.95) (72.07) (97.41) (87.24) (87.18)
Panel C: Discontinuity in monthly logged earnings .126*** .180*** .128*** .176*** .142*** .147***
(.04) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.06)
With Controls .120*** .140** .129*** .172*** .132** .144**
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 711 1404 1991 2532 3003 4296
Notes: Controls include exam specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings,birth order, socioeconomic status, scores on the
Brevet examination, score on the grade 11 national French exam, scores in grade 6 national assessment exam in Mathematics. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table B.7: ‘Donut’ type regression discontinuity estimates for quantity of education
variables.
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity in
likelihood of ever graduating
secondary school
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .007 –.006 –.002 –.023 –.024
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .011 –.000 .002 –.022 –.024
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
likelihood of having a post
Baccalaureate degree
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .010 .078 .068 .019 .003
(.06) (.08) (.06) (.09) (.08)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .085 .074 .017 –.009 .061
(.05) (.10) (.06) (.11) (.09)
Panel C: Discontinuity in years
of Post-Baccalaureate education
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .443** .318 .145 .226 .211
(.17) (.31) (.22) (.34) (.30)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .406** .172 .039 .030 .059
(.20) (.37) (.25) (.41) (.35)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two
Observations (excluding 9.75-10.1) 411 1042 1587 2048 2452
Observations (excluding 9.65-10.1) 361 992 1537 1998 2402
Notes: *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table B.8: ‘Donut’ type regression discontinuity estimates for quality of education variables.
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity in average
institution Baccalaureate score
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .291*** .377*** .337*** .455*** .387***
(.08) (.13) (.09) (.17) (.12)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .286*** .425*** .362*** .530*** .414***
(.09) (.15) (.11) (.19) (.13)
Panel B: Discontinuity in likelihood
of being in STEM major
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .111** .150* .187*** .209** .209***
(.05) (.08) (.06) (.09) (.08)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .127** .207** .231*** .286*** .270***
(.05) (.10) (.07) (.11) (.09)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two
Observations (excluding 9.75-10.1) 403 1027 1566 2018 2414
Observations (excluding 9.65-10.1) 358 982 1521 1973 2369
Notes: *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by university and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.9: ‘Donut’ type regression discontinuity estimates for labor market variables.
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity in
likelihood of employment
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) –.011 –.021 .012 .020 .050
(.03) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) –.032 –.061 –.008 –.022 .031
(.03) (.06) (.04) (.07) (.06)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
net monthly earnings
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) 276.763*** 439.358*** 275.388*** 457.806*** 321.402***
(81.43) (138.75) (94.90) (145.81) (124.27)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) 236.559*** 401.969** 211.524** 367.397** 224.037
(89.70) (162.32) (105.61) (168.49) (141.90)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two
Observations (excluding 9.75-10.1) 433 1128 1715 2256 2727
Observations (excluding 9.65-10.1) 375 1070 1657 2198 2669
Notes: *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Std. errors clustered at the indiv. level and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.10: Regression discontinuity estimates for individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds.
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Averaged institution
Baccalaureate score .149 .107 .173 .235 .159 .059
(.10) (.17) (.12) (.18) (.17) (.10)
Panel B: Likelihood of being in
STEM major .178*** .234*** .264*** .296*** .304*** .317***
(.05) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.07)
Panel C: Monthly logged earnings .138*** .187*** .108** .188*** .126** .129**
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 327 674 959 1181 1369 1795
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05
* p <0.1
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APPENDIX C
Figure C1: Local polynomial figures for school inputs [Going to a better school].
(a) Peer quality based on scores on high
school entrance exam.
(b) Peer quality based on scores on high
school entrance exam (males only).
(c) Peer quality based on scores on high
school entrance exam (females only).
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam
(HET) in the year 2007.
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Figure C2: Local polynomial figures for college entrance exam test scores [Going to
a better school].
(a) College entrance exam test scores.
(b) College entrance exam test scores (males
only).
(c) College entrance exam test scores (Fe-
males only).
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam
(HET) in the year 2007.
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Figure C3: Local polynomial figures for college outcomes [Going to a better school].
(a) Eligibility to attend a four year college. (b) Eligibility to attend an elite college.
(c) Eligibility to attend a four year college
(Males only).
(d) Eligibility to attend an elite college (Males
only).
(e) Eligibility to attend a four year college
(Females only).
(f) Eligibility to attend an elite college (Fe-
males only).
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam (HET)
in the year 2007. Since we observe individuals with multiple cutoffs, we cluster at
the student ID level.
Eligibility defined as meeting the minimum score required to enter college type.
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Figure C4: Local polynomial figures for the first stage as well as school inputs. [Going
to a tier-1 school].
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(a) Probability of attending tier 1 high school.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 13.38(1.70)
(b) Peer quality based on scores on high
school entrance exam.
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam in
the year 2007. Standard errors clustered at score level.
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Figure C5: Local polynomial figures for college entrance exam test scores and college
outcomes [Going to a tier-1 school].
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(a) College entrance exam scores.
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(b) Eligibility to attend a four year college.
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(c) Eligibility to attend an elite college.
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam in
the year 2007. Standard errors clustered at score level.
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Figure C6: Local polynomial figures representing the first stage as well as school
inputs for males versus females. [Going to a tier-1 school].
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(a) Prob. of attending tier 1 school.
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(b) Prob. of attending tier-1 school.
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(c) High school peer quality.
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(d) High school peer quality.
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam in
the year 2007. Standard errors clustered at score level.
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Figure C7: Local polynomial figures representing test score and college outcomes for
males versus females [Going to a tier-1 school].
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(a) College entrance exam scores.
Females
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Estimated Discontinuity: 2.24(2.22)
(b) College entrance exam scores.
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(c) Eligibility to attend a 4-year college.
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.0054(0.042)
(d) Eligibility to attend a 4-year college.
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(e) Eligibility to attend an elite college.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.0081(0.010)
(f) Eligibility to attend an elite college.
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam in
the year 2007. Standard errors clustered at score level.
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Figure C8: Validity of the RD design for both empirical strategies.
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(b) Distribution of HET scores.
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(c) Smoothness of baseline covariates.
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(d) Smoothness of baseline covariates.s
Notes: Sample includes students who took the HET exam in the year 2007.
Bins for histogram represent an average count of 2 score points.
Predicted score based on the following controls: sex, gender, district fixed
effects, middle school fixed effect.
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Figure C9: Smoothness of baseline covariates.
Going to a better school
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(a) Probability of being female.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.022(0.018)
(b) Probability of being female.
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(c) Age at time of high school exam.
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(d) Age at time of high school exam.
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam in the
year 2007.
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Figure C10: Selection into the college entrance exam.
Going to a Better school
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(a) Selection into the CET exam.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.0169(0.009)
(b) Selection into the CET exam.
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.0069(0.0053)
(c) Selection into the CET exam (Males only).
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.006(0.0147)
(d) Selection into the CET exam (Males
only).
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.0076(0.0048)
(e) Selection into the CET exam (Females
only).
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.0257(0.0144)
(f) Selection into the CET exam (Females
only).
Notes: Sample includes students who took the high school entrance exam in the
year 2007 (including those with no college entrance exam scores).
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Figure C11: Teacher and school characteristics.
Going to a tier-1 school
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(c) Number of students per superior teacher
at threshold of attending ‘best’ high schools.
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
M
ea
n 
st
ud
en
s 
pe
r s
up
er
io
r t
ea
ch
er
−50 0 50
Score on the 2007 HET exam
Number of students per superior teacher
(d) Number of students per superior teacher
at threshold of attending ‘better’ high
schools.
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(e) Ratio of female teachers at threshold of
attending ‘best’ high schools.
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(f) Ratio of female teachers at threshold of
attending ‘better’ high schools.
Notes: Sample based off of school level data.
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Figure C12: Potential outcomes from going to a tier 1 high school (threats to inter-
pretation).
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.015(0.018)
(a) Likelihood of majoring in arts versus sci-
ences in high school.
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Estimated Discontinuity: .006(0.027)
(b) Exact age when taking the 2010 CET
exam.
Notes: Sample includes students who took the CET exam in the year 2010 with
known high school cutoffs. Standard errors clustered at the running variable
level.
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Table C.1: Descriptive statistics for students taking the high school entrance exam in 2007 in the three Rural towns
studied.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Whole Sample Tier 1 Schools Tier 2 Schools Tier 3 Schools Tier 4 Schools
High School entrance exam scores 612.39 643.28 607.5 537.06 495.21
(61.14) (53.54) (33.99) (48.91) (31.92)
College entrance exam scores 492.66 540.31 470.99 399.67 342.47
(96.92) (81) (79.44) (79.55) (66.88)
Gender of student (1= female) 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.50
Likelihood of choosing arts in high school 0.48 0.41 0.51 0.65 0.68
Percent private schools 0.010 0.006 0.015 0.018 0
School is High School only 0.57 0.69 0.60 0.17 1
Eligibility for four year college 0.44 0.67 0.28 0.067 0.016
Eligibility for elite college 0.086 0.165 0.012 0.002 0
Gender of teacher (1= female) 0.53 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.52
School Size 147.45 183.37 131.88 87.71 83
(81.83) (98.19) (36.05) (28.06) (0)
Number of teachers 208.89 247 191 144 170
(73.74) (77.79) (42.07) (25.23) (0)
Number of superior teachers 61.22 92.13 45.21 15.06 30
(50.57) (46.5) (31.72) (12) (0)
Number of schools 36 11 12 12 1
Number of Students 15367 7462 5367 2220 309
Notes: Data taken from three rural districts in the Province for students taking the high school entrance exam in 2007.
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Table C.2: RD estimates for high school peer quality attributed to going to a ‘better high school’—using CCT optimal
bandwidth.
Bandwidth 0.75 CCT CCT 1.25 CCT 1.5 CCT 2 CCT 2.5 CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:
Discontinuity in high school peer quality 10.945*** 10.507*** 11.494*** 10.429*** 10.041*** 8.810***
(1.48) (1.30) (1.15) (1.02) (.86) (.71)
With Controls 10.971*** 10.581*** 11.393*** 10.275*** 9.845*** 8.745***
(1.40) (1.24) (1.09) (.96) (.82) (.68)
Score Polynomial One One One One One One
Observations 13729 19409 24867 28997 38439 47872
Notes: Sample includes students who took the college entrance exam in the year 2007 with known high school cutoffs.
Controls include: Age, gender, district fixed effects and middle school fixed effects. Optimal Bandwidth selected using the
CCT bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. (2015).
Optimal BW = 14 for high school peer quality regressions.
Since we observe individuals with multiple cutoffs, we cluster at the student ID level.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table C.3: RD estimates for college outcomes attributed to going to a ‘better high school’—using CCT optimal band-
width.
Bandwidth 0.75 CCT CCT 1.25 CCT 1.5 CCT 2 CCT 2.5 CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity
in college entrance exam test scores –.147 –.209 .412 .541 .722 –.100
(1.95) (1.62) (1.40) (1.09) (.89) (1.36)
With Controls –.880 –1.098 –.442 –.205 –.201 –.557
(1.86) (1.57) (1.31) (1.02) (.84) (1.28)
Panel B: Discontinuity
in eligibility of attending a 4-year college .010 .001 .006 .004 .013*** –.003
(.010) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.004) (.007)
With Controls .006 –.004 .002 .001 .009** –.006
(.010) (.008) (.006) (.005) (.004) (.007)
Panel C: Discontinuity
in eligibility of attending an elite college .002 .003 .004 .003 .006*** .004
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003)
With Controls .002 .002 .004 .003 .006*** .003
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Score Polynomial One One One One One Two
Observations 30292 39801 49208 59548 77125 95051
Notes: Controls include: Age, gender, district fixed effects and middle school fixed effects. Optimal BW = 29 for
College entrance exam test scores regressions. Optimal BW = 31 and 22 for eligibility to attend 4-year
and elite elite college regressions respectively. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table C.4: Heterogeneous RD estimates from going to a ‘better high school’ regres-
sions.
Bandwidth All Males Females Score Polynomial
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Discontinuity in
inputs into education
Peer Quality 11.478*** 9.574*** 13.106*** Quadratic
(1.06) (1.58) (1.41)
Panel B: Discontinuity
in outcomes
College entrance exam scores –0.476 –0.701 –0.276 Linear
(1.17) (1.94) (1.36)
Eligibility to attend
4-year college 0.002 0.003 –0.001 Linear
(.006) (.009) (.009)
Eligibility to attend
elite college 0.0020 -0.0025 0.0064 Quadratic
(.004) (.006) (.0045)
Observations 54367 25190 29177
Notes: All regressions include controls: Age, gender, district fixed effects and middle
school fixed effects.
For ease of comparison, all regressions use an equal bandwidth of 40 score
points on either side of the cutoff.
Since we observe individuals with multiple cutoffs, we cluster at the student ID level.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table C.5: RD estimates for high school inputs attributed to going to the ‘best high schools’—using CCT optimal
bandwidth.
Bandwidth 0.75 CCT CCT 1.25 CCT 1.5 CCT 2 CCT 2.5 CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity
in Prob. of attending tier 1 school .543*** .557*** .537*** .544*** .522*** .540***
(.06) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
With Controls: .568*** .572*** .542*** .546*** .523*** .539***
(.06) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
high school peer quality 17.174*** 19.848*** 17.772*** 17.165*** 12.806*** 13.591***
(2.28) (2.38) (1.96) (1.88) (2.00) (1.83)
With Controls: 21.201*** 22.276*** 19.327*** 17.974*** 13.704*** 14.096***
(2.80) (2.47) (2.02) (1.80) (1.92) (1.67)
Score Polynomial One One One One One One
Observations 2575 3324 4227 4983 6607 8061
Notes: Number of observations correspond to the high school peer quality regressions.
Controls include: Gender, age when taking exam, district fixed effects and Middle school fixed effects.
Optimal Bandwidth selected using the CCT bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. (2015).
Optimal BW = 20 for Probability of attending tier 1 school regressions.
Optimal BW = 18 for high school peer quality regressions.
Standard errors clustered at the score level. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table C.6: RD estimates for college outcomes attributed to going to the ‘best high schools’—using CCT optimal band-
width.
Bandwidth 0.75 CCT CCT 1.25 CCT 1.5 CCT 2 CCT 2.5 CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity
in college entrance exam test scores 5.151* 6.017** 7.703*** 8.034*** 8.816*** 9.424***
(3.06) (2.61) (2.34) (2.23) (1.91) (1.69)
With Controls: 5.522** 5.855*** 7.831*** 7.607*** 7.936*** 7.945***
(2.48) (2.07) (1.91) (1.89) (1.61) (1.46)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
eligibility to attend 4 year college .055 .054 .053 .074** .099*** .129***
(.05) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02)
With Controls: .061 .053 .051* .073*** .097*** .125***
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Panel C: Discontinuity
in eligibility to attend elite college .013* .002 .009 .010 –.002 –.009
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
With Controls: .014** .004 .009 .009 –.002 –.009
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Score Polynomial One One One One One One
Observations 4788 6233 7760 8956 11081 12601
Notes: Controls include: Gender, age when taking exam, district fixed effects and Middle school fixed effects.
Optimal BW = 34 for College entrance exam test scores regressions. Optimal BW = 25 and 13 for
probability of attending 4 year and elite college regressions respectively.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table C.7: ITT and LATE RD estimates for all students, as well as male and female students going to the ‘best high
schools’.
Treatment effect ITT LATE ITT LATE ITT LATE
Gender All Males Females Polynomial
Panel A: First stage
Likelihood of attending tier 1 school .523*** —- .531*** —- .523*** —- Linear
(.03) (.04) (.03)
Panel B: Discontinuity in school inputs
High school peer quality 13.449*** 26.053*** 13.496*** 26.085*** 13.714*** 26.407*** Linear
(1.79) (2.38) (2.15) (2.70) (2.03) (2.85)
Panel C: Discontinuity in outcomes
College entrance exam test scores 8.023*** 15.876*** 16.427*** 32.968*** 0.799 1.131 Linear
(1.95) (3.88) (3.75) (7.407) (2.13) (3.99)
Eligibility to attend a 4-year college .080*** .157*** .110*** .230*** –.030 –.058 Linear
(.025) (.05) (.03) (.06) (.047) (.083)
Eligibility to attend an elite college .006 .012 .021 .037 -.005 –.009 Quadratic
(.008) (.015) (.014) (.025) (.009) (.016)
Observations 7235 7235 3273 3273 3962 3962
Notes: For ease of comparison, all regressions use an equal bandwidth of 40 score points on either side of the cutoff. *** p
<0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table C.8: Regression discontinuity estimates for baseline covariates—using CCT optimal bandwidth.
Bandwidth 0.75 CCT CCT 1.25 CCT 1.5 CCT 2 CCT 2.5 CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: (Going to a top-tier school)
Predicted HET score .098 –.202 .425 .202 –.831 –.595
(1.66) (1.53) (1.38) (1.28) (1.16) (1.03)
Observations 2575 3324 4227 4983 6607 8061
Panel B: (Going to a better school)
Predicted HET score .398 .020 –.051 –.149 –.080 –.194
(.40) (.36) (.31) (.30) (.26) (.23)
Observations 35749 46549 58246 68514 89320 108424
Score Polynomial One One One One One One
Notes: Controls for predicted HET score include: gender, age, middle school fixed effects and district fixed effects.
Optimal Bandwidth selected using the CCT bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. (2015).
Optimal BW = 18 for going to a top tier school.
Optimal BW = 34 for going to a better school.
** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table C.9: Regression discontinuity estimates for separate baseline covariates—using CCT optimal bandwidth.
Bandwidth 0.75 CCT CCT 1.25 CCT 1.5 CCT 2 CCT 2.5 CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: (Going to a top-tier school)
Likelihood of being a female .050* .048** .040** .031 .023 .011
(.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Age when taking HET entrance exam –.026 .001 .006 .004 .003 .009
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Observations 3669 4788 6028 7118 9135 10748
Panel B: (Going to a better school)
Likelihood of being a female –.006 –.010 –.011 –.009 –.008 –.008
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age when taking HET entrance exam –.005 .005 –.003 –.002 .002 –.002
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Observations 35749 46549 58246 68514 89320 108424
Score Polynomial One One One One One One
Notes: Optimal BW = 26 for probability of being a female (going to the best schools). Optimal BW =
34 for age when taking high school entrance exam (going to the best schools). Optimal BW = 34 for
probability of being a female (going to a better school). Optimal BW = 40 for age when taking high
school entrance exam (going to a better school). *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
170
Table C.10: Regression discontinuity estimates for selection into the college entrance exam—using CCT optimal band-
width.
Bandwidth 0.75 CCT CCT 1.25 CCT 1.5 CCT 2 CCT 2.5 CCT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: (Going to the best schools)
Selecting into the CET entrance exam (All) .022 .013 .018* .0177* .0167** .006
(.015) (.011) (.011) (.01) (.0084) (.008)
Females only .029 .016 .022 .023 .029** .010
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Males only .013 .009 .012 .011 .003 –.000
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Observations (females) 2395 3157 3927 4704 5919 6955
Observations (males) 2050 2681 3315 3982 5035 5908
Panel B: (Going to a better school)
Selecting into the CET entrance exam (All) .003 –.000 .004 .002 –.001 –.001
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.002) (.003) (.003)
Females only –.005 –.011 –.007 –.004 –.006 –.005
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00)
Males only .012 .012 .012 .009 .005 .004
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.008)
Observations (females) 17778 23771 29785 35641 46253 57189
Observations (males) 15574 21030 26410 31474 40971 50681
Score Polynomial One One One One One One
Notes: Optimal BW = 29 for likelihood of taking CET exam (going to the best school). Optimal BW = 27
for likelihood of taking CET exam (going to a better school). *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
171
Table C.11: Bounding analysis for the college entrance exam score regressions (going to the best schools).
Bandwidth 26 points 34 points 43 points 51 points 68 points 84 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Selection into the
CET exam .0170 .0136 .0158 .0172* .011 .003
(.011) (.011) (.01) (.009) (.008) (.008)
Constant (Control mean) 0.900 0.906 0.904 0.905 0.914 0.922
Proportion to be trimmed 1.8% 1.5% 1.74% 1.9% 1.2% 0.3 %
Panel B: College entrance exam test
scores (Original regression estimates) 5.151* 6.017** 7.703*** 8.034*** 8.816*** 9.424***
(3.06) (2.61) (2.34) (2.23) (1.91) (1.69)
College entrance exam test
scores (Lower bound estimates) 4.206 5.75** 7.290*** 8.120*** 9.66*** 9.64***
(2.91) (2.93) (2.26) (2.46) (1.98) (1.90)
College entrance exam test
scores (Upper bound estimates) 8.63*** 10.12*** 13.27*** 13.89*** 13.03*** 10.90***
(3.24) (2.56) (2.23) (2.14) (2.01) (1.86)
Observations 4788 6233 7760 8956 11081 12601
Observations after trimming 4743 6182 7685 8868 11016 12509
Score Polynomial One One One One One One
Notes: To ease comparison with our previous estimates, we use the same bandwidths predicted by the CCT for the original college
entrance score regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors reported for the upper and lower bound estimates.*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05
* p <0.1
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